THEOLOGY

VOL. XLI DECEMBER, 1940 No. 246

EDITORIAL

THERE is room and sometimes a definite need within the Church for party organizations which will concentrate attention and action upon the removal of particular abuses, the correction of current errors, the propagation of neglected or threatened truths, or the trial of new discoveries. Such organizations habitually make the mistake of denying that they are "party"—*i.e.*, partial and transitory; but that is a natural human failing. In any case, however excellent their initial object, with rare exceptions they ought, after a generation or two, to be liquidated; for, if they have not by then achieved it, they never will, and they had best be replaced by a fresh instrument. Moreover, after the first burst of activity, they are usually found to be under the control of old men whose interests were fixed under conditions that have passed away. These general reflections are illustrated in the existing party organizations in the Church of England, and for this reason we do not regret their declining vitality, which has been a marked feature of the past decade. There is a special irony in the staleness of the Modern Churchmen's Union: its ill-advised adoption of the title "Modern" has become more a liability than an asset. We do not know that there is at present much attraction in being up-to-date; there is none at all in having been up-to-date a generation ago. Nevertheless, as long as this and other organizations hold together, attempts may well be made to use their resources for good purposes, and the possibility of a new lease of life is not to be excluded.

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There appears now to be in the Modern Churchmen's Union a number of younger members who are aware of these circumstances, and who are trying to give a fresh direction to its activities. Their organ is a quarterly journal called *The Way*,[1] and the October number contains the first part of the "Report of the M.C.U. Sociology

[1] Blackwell, 6d. per copy; 2s. per annum, post free.

Commission" on "The Principles of Christian Social Ethics". Whether or not the Report will be adopted by the Union remains to be seen. We sincerely hope that it will be. Not, indeed, that it is incapable of improvement; but its adoption in substance would encourage the hope that the M.C.U. is prepared to use its resources in order to make a valuable contribution to sociological thought. Heretofore, with one or two exceptions, its members have not been conspicuous for interest in this range of studies. They have had little to say except the conventional platitudes. If they can now pass beyond their tiresome absorption in questions which have lost much of their relevance, and take part in the solution of what have become our most pressing problems, the step will be welcomed outside the Union itself.

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The Report of the Commission is divided into six sections: (1) The Theological Basis, (2) The Teaching of Jesus, (3) The Social Record of the Church, (4) General Principles of Christian Social Ethics Today, (5) Some Cardinal Christian Principles, and (6) Some Practical Steps. The connexion between these sections is in some cases rather unsatisfactory,[1] and the latter half of the Report is more fully and deeply worked out than the former. Even here there are serious omissions; there is no adequate reference to the place of the family in a Christian polity, nor to agriculture as an activity of society which is (to say the least) equal in importance to industry. But, allowing for more or less serious shortcomings, we regard the Report as of great value because it works out an approach to sociological problems along what may be called "Niebuhrian" lines. We surmise that it is the work of a group upon whose minds the writings of Dr Niebuhr have had a dominant influence, and one does not need to be a blind adherent of his teaching in order to wish that it may be more widely expounded and reckoned with by Christians who have to deal with the English situation. If this Report

[1] *E.g.*, paragraph 4 begins with the words: "We have seen that the Christian approaches the task of expressing his convictions in the life of human society armed with a faith based on the mission and message of Jesus; and that this is not only a far-reaching moral challenge, but also a Gospel of grace"; but in fact the word "grace" has not hitherto been mentioned, and the basis of the Gospel of redemption has not been laid in such a way as to bear the structure that is placed upon it.

is followed up, as we hope it may be, by concerted work on lines parallel to those along which the Christendom group have been pioneers, the benefit to sociological work in the Church of England should be considerable. These young Modern Churchmen are fully alive to the danger of amateurishness. We wonder if they realize the immensity of the task to which they have set their hand.

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Among the " Practical Steps " which they advocate is the development of " specialized ministries, whether clerical or lay, in the Christian Church, of men and women who could keep abreast of the best theoretical work of the day, especially in the social sciences, including psychology and education, and of tendencies in politics and industry ". This need has long been evident, but so far as we know very little has been done about it. It ought to have a prominent place in any re-ordering of the work of the Church that is being planned under the stimulus of the war situation. We hope it will engage the attention of the Archbishop of York's conference which is to meet at Malvern in January. One reason why it is difficult to expect any very definite result of such a Conference is that the proper steps preliminary to a Christian advance in the sociological field have been for so long neglected.

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" On pourrait dire qu'un certain partage de fonctions se produit ici entre le clergé et le laïcat, et qu'il appartient davantage aux laïques de manifester l'immanence du christianisme en se plongeant dans les choses du siècle et en y agissant en chrétiens; et davantage aux prêtres de manifester la transcendance de la religion en se consacrant au service des âmes et au royaume de Dieu, et en se gardant, comme du pire malheur où ils puissent tomber, d'asservis leur mission aux hommes qui voudraient exploiter pour leurs factions, leurs entreprises ou leurs guerres tout ce qu'il y a de saint."—JACQUES MARITAIN: *Questions de Conscience* (1938), p. 215.

Afterthoughts on an Escape from Holland

1. He who tries to realize why he has cut the many links that bound him to the soil of his country is at first puzzled as to what considerations brought him to his final decision. Many times before, when the world was still at peace and the political questions seemed to be apt for a solution without the use of might and destruction, he may have theorized on the duties of one who may be taking part in a struggle for his country; it may be that a clear-cut opinion, a radical way out, had been found after a mental struggle of years' duration.

But, when the real decision had to be taken in a supreme hour of emergency, this previous conclusion proved too abstract, too theoretical. It is only now, after the decision has been taken and one has—in a way—become accustomed to the new situation, that the considerations one hoped to conform with come up again in one's mind, and one tries to reconcile them with the accomplished fact.

It seems that, if a decision such as many Dutchmen had to take—as to whether they could help best by surrendering or by trying to fight elsewhere—is put before one, so many elements (however dimly realized) enter into consideration, that in the supreme moment it is hardly possible to state with certainty which element finally ruled the decision. Not that every element can be reviewed separately before the decision is taken, but one feels at the time, and afterwards becomes much more aware of the fact, that with great rapidity a whole range of most contradictory thoughts were going through one's mind, when suddenly the decision was taken.

2. Suppose one tries now to analyse some of these reflections, making an effort to see them in the light thrown upon them by the Word of God. The mere circumstance that in moments of supreme emergency decisions seem to be taken " as in a dream " and that however well prepared one might have been beforehand by abstract considerations, which were entirely applicable to the actual decision that had to be taken, all this preparation seems to have been useless, does not necessarily point to its unimportance, but rather to the all-embracing fact that we are in the Hands of God. After all, man does not make his life himself: God leads man, and it is just in supreme moments that he

becomes aware of God's " leadership ". This leadership, however, which throws all previous abstract considerations into the background, does not free man from the need of thought; a need to bring about a state of mind receptive to the Word of God whenever it is heard. Abstract considerations are therefore not to be condemned, if they are an effort to conform to the Word of God.

3. One of these abstract considerations takes into account the value of one's own existence, a point which proves to be of extreme importance in just such a decision as those who escaped from Holland had to make. In war one is struggling for one's life in the most concrete sense. All the accessories and luxuries fall off one after another, till the mere living alone remains.

It is therefore an " existential decision " which is taken. This expression needs some further explanation, particularly because it points to one of the vital and most important elements of philosophy and religion. In modern philosophy (*e.g.*, in the philosophy of Heidegger) " existence " means the opposite of " rule ". The variations in life cannot be concentrated in rules; every element has its own value and its own significance.

Understandable as reaction against the abstractions of the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, the existential philosophy is unsatisfactory because it gives no perspective. It justly points out that life is full of unbridgeable contradictions, which cannot be solved by any human effort, but equally with the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, it takes no account of the reconciliation by Christ of God and Man. If Hegel's view, that the solution of every thesis and antithesis is found in a synthesis, the elements of which are already contained in the thesis and antithesis, is insufficient, because it presupposes mankind as completely capable of solving the contradictions of life without the help of God, so also does the existential philosophy leave God out by denying the possibility of any solution whatever.

However, the failure of the existential philosophy to solve the enigma of life does not prove that existence is not the fundamental basis on which the conception of life has to be built. On the contrary, just this failure drives man, in his existential needs and deficiencies, towards faith: the belief that Christ has taken up our sins and that He alone reconciles the world with God.

In this light the earlier remark—that supreme decisions

are taken " as in a dream "—is to be considered. When one is reduced to the condition of mere " existence ", as those were who escaped from Holland, one realizes far more intensely than when all material things are in one's favour, that one can only decide with the help of God, and put one's own existence at His service by placing it at the service of the country. At the same time that we put our existence at the service of God, we are hazarding our existence for that of our brothers, because inasmuch as we have helped one of the least of our brothers, we have helped Christ (Matt. xxv, 40).

4. We cannot, here, discuss all the aspects of existence in personal and social life, but one thing has to be stressed. As well as the individual existence, there is the existence of peoples. The existence of their own people was an important element in the special decision which the Dutchmen in question had to make.

If it is true that in war one struggles for one's own life, one does it in struggling for the existence of the community to which one belongs. This struggle would have no meaning at all, if one were not convinced, on the one hand, that only in and by the community is one's personal existence possible, and, on the other hand, that it is God's will that a man ventures his existence for that of his brothers.

Let us consider what light God throws on the communal existence. He shows by the Elect People—the Jews—that every other people has a separate and independent value, for the sake of which every member of the community has, if necessary, to sacrifice his life.

The Jewish people shows the relative significance of all communal elements and brings them into relation with God. For in the building up of every community one can distinguish two elements: one can consider either that it is the free will of the members of the community that constitutes its working, or that it is the common origin or the common relationship to the soil that composes its foundations.

The Jews show the truth of the relative importance of the first of these elements (viz., the free will of the members of the community) by conforming themselves to the needs of the people, among which they live, in a way unsurpassed by other peoples, while at the same time they illustrate the contrary fact by not being able to become so completely assimilated in any people as not to be regarded as foreigners.

If, on the other hand, every people is built up on the

elements of " blood and soil ", inherent and indestructible in each individual of the community, then, again, the Jews show the truth and the untruth of this statement by still exhibiting the characteristics of their race, notwithstanding centuries of persecution and dispersal, and, at the same time, by showing in their differences of character and occupation that everyone is, to a great extent, independent of his descent.

Thus the Jews are a token to other peoples. They show not only the relative significance of the human elements making up a community, but they also bring these elements into relation with God, because, notwithstanding their faults as members of the Elect People, they are preserved to fulfil their mission, which is, in this respect, to show that all peoples are equally dependent on God as are the Jews themselves, and that they all have their own peculiar mission.

For, since those in authority in the community are responsible to God, they must conform with the commands of the Bible. And, therefore, while making use of both the above-mentioned elements of communal life, they must take warning by the Jews to avoid being cast away as they are through their denial of Christ (cf. Rom. xi, 15). To take warning by the Jews means that one must not draw the wrong conclusion from their relative representation of the two elements of communal life—viz., that they represent these elements only relatively, and that the other peoples might represent these elements in a higher degree, for this would lead to anti-Semitism. On the contrary, one must acknowledge that the Christian peoples have sinned as the Jews have, but in opposition to the latter the former are able to bring the elements of communal life into relation with God through Christ.

Thus it is the mission of all peoples to do their part in the bringing about of the Kingdom of God, and God holds every people responsible for its fulfilment. Only those peoples which acknowledge Christ as the Supreme Revelation can fulfil their mission.

In this fulfilment they are guided by the Jews as the Elect People: they must take the Jews as a token; for, as we have said, the Jews show in their ambiguity that the communal elements have not a final but a relative value. True though it may be that the Jews are unable to show the real meaning of this relativity—which can only be understood from the Christian standpoint, *i.e.*, that it brings the communal

elements into relation with God—they are nevertheless a token to the other peoples. Their unconsciousness of their real mission—the negation of Jesus Christ as our Lord and Saviour—is just the proof of their election, and it is after all the mystery of the Revelation.

So every people is responsible for its actions to God, and only when trying to do His will is it justified in asking individual sacrifices for its own maintenance as a whole.

With these considerations before one's eyes, the sacrifice of one's personality, or even of one's life, may be asked, and in such a decision as that under discussion this must be borne in mind. Here, too, it is seen that God leads our way wherever we go.

5. Even if, as may be the case, other considerations (*e.g.*, as to one's personal safety) decided one to escape from Holland, one now must make up one's mind whether the sacrifice is to be made for the community or for oneself. If for the community, one must be convinced that the Dutch people did, before the war, fulfil the mission that God had designed for it, and that it is necessary to enable it to continue to fulfil this mission.

This leads up to another equally important afterthought. Now that the Government has left the country, the elements making up a people are separated. In a normal state the sovereignty is executed in the land where the sovereignty exists. This is no more the case with Holland, where the legitimate Government is abroad and the country is ruled in the name of the invader.

Thus the Dutchman is confronted with the choice of taking the soil or the Government as the dearest and most important element of his Fatherland. The choice between those two is not so easy as it may seem at first sight.

In the Protestant tradition two trends of mind are to be distinguished: the Lutheran, which holds that a revolution against the sovereign in possession of the effective power is never allowed; and the Calvinist, which holds that whenever man is, on religious grounds, convinced that the sovereign having effective power is ruling against the will of God, he is justified in revolution.

Both acknowledge that God's will can be revealed to mankind and that God has a mission for every individual as well as for every community, but Calvin, more than Luther, trusts to the religious insight of man, whereas Luther, more than Calvin, trusts that God will lead this

world after His will notwithstanding the submission of mankind to the ruling sovereign. Here, as in other questions, the Bible leaves us to make the existential choice. There are texts in favour of either opinion.

Karl Barth has shown that even in one human life adherence to both opinions is possible. Whereas in his *Epistle to the Romans* he rejects every revolution on the ground that the new situation, brought about by revolution, is always as sinful as the old one replaced by it, in his later works he makes his choice for a certain human form of life, and rejects the opposite.

Attention may be drawn to the fact that even in books with no definitely religious background—as, *e.g.*, E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*—it is acknowledged that " power " and " morality " play an equally important part in international politics.

Even for the religious man a certain element of conviction arises out of the actual tenure of temporal power. He will always, of course, hold that no government, however powerful, may neglect certain religious truths and that earthly power is derived from God and is not to be reverenced in its own right. But, on the other hand, the religious man must accentuate the historical relativity of all political power. Here, as in other ways, it seems that mankind is too apt to look upon the present situation and the traditional values as eternal, although he is taught by Ecclesiastes that all upon earth is relative. Taking this into account, one has to make one's decisions for the future, bearing in mind that the government having effective power in Holland is that of the invader where the legitimate government is abroad.

This choice for the future will be different according to the strength of the feeling that the accomplishment of facts reveals the will of God. The *fait accompli* determines history to a large extent, and no nation can be said not to have complied with these *faits accomplis* sooner or later. However, the *fait accompli* loses much of its convincing strength if the opinion prevails that the Kingdom of God does not reveal itself in any human form at all and that, in truth, our " conversation is in Heaven " (Phil. iii, 20). Then religious considerations estrange a man from this world, so that he struggles only for the freedom of his religious opinions.

We have said that everyone can only make an existential

choice, but this does not prevent the community from obliging every member to make the choice which the community thinks the best. Destruction of life may have been condemned by Christ more than once; at the same time He tells us to sacrifice ourselves for the aims set by His Heavenly Father, one of which is, as we have shown, the maintenance of the different nations and the fulfilment of their mission for the propagation of the reign of God.

We must not forget that the Bible is not a book without contradictions. The Bible does not hide the antinomies and antitheses of life, but brings them to the full light so as to strengthen our faith in the Mediation of Christ.

6. Referring again to the fact that one of God's plans is the maintenance of the nations and the fulfilment of their mission, we come to another afterthought. What are the peace aims for which we are struggling? These, too, have to be taken into consideration, for it is evident that at the moment, when a further struggle seemed to be impossible, one would not have escaped with a view to continue fighting elsewhere if the aims of the struggle had not been thought to be of the utmost importance.

Now there are people who say that the annihilation of the defeated must be absolute and that this is the sole condition of a lasting peace. If one is of the opinion that every people has its own mission, this view must be looked upon as unchristian. God teaches the peoples by international controversies and struggles, that the only way to learn their mission is to try to do His will and to feel themselves responsible for every act to Him. The question of the annihilation of peoples is not one for man's decision, but for God alone.

There is nowadays an ever-growing awareness of the importance of the community as a whole and a devaluation of the personality. In a way it is—at least on the Continent—a reaction against the stress put upon the importance of the individual by the French Revolution and to be explained by the alteration of economic relations. But, in any case, the conviction that for the Christian every people has an independent value for God, obliges the victorious peoples to enable the defeated peoples to fulfil their mission, or, as Barth put it in the letter to his French friends, written at the beginning of this war, to give them their necessary conditions of life.[1]

[1] See THEOLOGY, March, 1940, p. 215.

If one takes a decision such as that described above, it is only natural that one wants to continue to act for the good cause as soon as possible, but it may happen that one's impulse is suddenly restrained and that one has to wait till a task is given. However, one has to recognize that God gives everyone his task in His time. He is the Sovereign Lord: one must watch at every moment (Mark xiii, 37) till He calls. In any case one is not allowed to think of a *service inutile* as long as one believes that He leads us.

H. Winkel.

Retreat to Authority

Political liberals have been much disturbed by the rise of totalitarianism in politics, and theological liberals have been not less disturbed by a parallel revival of totalitarianism in theology. In both spheres alike, political and theological, the perils and abuses of freedom have been contrasted with the safety and sanctity of authority. Democracy has been declared morally, and modernism intellectually, bankrupt. In Germany all the younger generation are Nazis, and in the Church all the younger clergy are catholics who bracket liberalism and modernism together as humanist heresies.

We are witnessing a swing of the pendulum away from nineteenth century liberalism in all its forms. This is natural, because in politics the twentieth century has presented problems insoluble on traditional liberal lines; while in theology liberalism had remained predominantly academic, and could not rival popular secularism or popular fundamentalism as a creed for the masses. Authoritarians in politics do honestly believe that democracy has been a sham and a failure, while authoritarians in theology are similarly convinced that modernism leads to vagueness and sentimentality, if not to scepticism and infidelity. They hold that the cure for all our present troubles lies in a return to authority both in the political and in the theological sphere. By some a return to authority in both spheres jointly is envisaged in the form of the establishment of a Corporate Catholic State, on the lines of that now existing in Portugal—a kind of theocracy.

This urgent demand for a return to authority arises from a deep-seated distrust of the individual man, who needs

discipline and correction if anything good is to be made of him. Neither his judgment nor his disposition is to be trusted, the one being unreliable and the other perverse. The Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin, stressed by orthodox protestants even more than by orthodox catholics, emphasizes this distrustful view of human nature. Only the church and its guidance stands between man and utter depravity. On this theory it is clear that liberty is more likely to be a curse than a blessing.

Thus the modern retreat to authority, where its motive is not simply a desire to exploit others, springs from a lack of faith in, and therefore from fear of, the average human individual. State and church must take him in hand. It should be noted in passing that this involves the exaltation of both church and state into something superhuman; otherwise what guarantee would there be that they were not infected with the same fatal weaknesses as all things human ? In which case how should they be fit to guide and govern ?

Thus the belief to set up against the new authoritarianism is belief in the average human being. It is this belief only that will stem the retreat to authority. And the basis of trust in the normal human individual is the knowledge (and not merely the theory) that he is not by nature an anti-social being, but one endowed with strong social instincts. These would be stronger even than they now are if it were not for the discouragement they receive from the present competitive organization of society, with its repercussions on the education of the young. As it is, the happiest because the most natural periods of most men's lives are those in which the competitive element is absent or at a minimum. Thus the unity of society is to be regarded as natural and organic, not artificial and forced. The cohesion of society is to be likened to the cohesion of the atoms in a molecule or to that of the cells in an organism rather than to that of metal compressed under a steam hammer. Thus, under favourable conditions, the coercive powers of the state could be reduced to a minimum, or at least employed to a minimum degree.

And not only is man naturally a social animal, but he is also, naturally, an intelligent animal. He is neither entirely depraved nor entirely stupid, but endowed with a certain natural decency and a certain natural common sense. His judgment on matters within his experience and

understanding is not to be despised; he can see through sophistry and humbug to a larger extent than is commonly supposed. The average man has a sense of reality which the doctrinaire, political or theological, often lacks.

Thus, without unduly idealizing the common man it may be said of him that his behaviour and his judgment are, within fairly wide limits, to be trusted, and there is no real need for the kind of imposed authority which our political and theological authoritarians plead for.

The alternative to the acceptance of an imposed authority is not, of course, the absence of all authority, but a natural authority, and one which authenticates and justifies itself and so has no need to be imposed. So far as the state is concerned a genuine democracy would supply the kind of authority needed, but we are less concerned here with the political side of the problem than with the religious side. What would be the nature of a genuine authority in the sphere of religion, one that would not need to be imposed, but would be self-authenticating?

Genuine authority in the sphere of religion may be presumed to be similar in kind to authority in those parallel spheres of human activity, science and art; that is to say, it will have to be the authority of the expert, of the man who knows. It is a comparatively simple matter to discern the expert in any branch of scientific knowledge; he is the person who has acquainted himself with whatever knowledge is available in that particular sphere. The competence of the scientific expert can also be tested with comparative ease, since his pronouncements can be checked ultimately by the appeal to sense experience. The competence of the expert in the sphere of art is less easily tested, since he cannot appeal, as the scientific expert can, to evidence supplied by those five senses with which all normal men are similarly equipped. The faculties of æsthetic perception are less evenly distributed than are the ordinary sense faculties; more men can recognize red or green than can recognize beauty. Thus the judgments of the æsthetic expert are not so readily checked as are those of the scientific expert; so much so that many have held that all æsthetic judgments are subjective only and have not the same objective validity as scientific doctrines.

The sphere of religion qualitatively resembles the sphere of art far more closely than that of science. In religion knowledge belongs to the expert, but as is the case with the

expert in art, his knowledge is not so easily tested as that of the expert in some branch of science. And yet, although this is the case, reliable knowledge in the sphere of religion seems even more valuable and necessary than the corresponding knowledge in the scientific sphere, for religion deals with ends, while science is concerned only with means. Science cannot be expected to pronounce on such high matters as the meaning and purpose of life, the significance of existence in general, and so on. Yet we can hardly dispense with knowledge on such matters. Some say that no such knowledge is to be had, and that there are no objective religious judgments any more than there are any objective æsthetic judgments; and that it is all matter of opinion. Yet we can hardly rest content with such a view, but feel it is highly desirable to have reliable knowledge in the religious sphere, as in the æsthetic sphere, however difficult it may be to obtain, or to test when obtained. The need for authoritative pronouncements in the sphere of religion is not artificial but real.

But it is not at all certain that to believe in the possibility of objective knowledge in the sphere of religion is the same thing as to believe in the possibility of precise and clear-cut definitions and formulas such as are available in science. We have to remember that religious insight, like æsthetic insight, may yield certainty to the individual percipient, but the certainty may be of some truth that cannot be expressed in such a manner as to be easily passed on to others. It is quite possible to possess genuine knowledge in the religious sphere which is not susceptible of being expressed in the same clear, definite and precise language in which scientific knowledge can be expressed. Jesus Himself, it will be remembered, spoke "in parables", "that hearing they might hear and not understand". His formula in teaching always was, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear"; the inference being that not everyone was capable of understanding what was being said. In view of this lack of cut-and-dried logical precision and definiteness in the deliverances of religious insight, and in view of the pressing need that is felt for clearly understood religious truth, it is not surprising that attempts should have been made to import scientific precision into the religious sphere. Such is the origin of theological dogma; it is an attempt to express religious truth in terms proper only to scientific truth. For religious truth is by its very nature

(like æsthetic truth) incapable of such expression. The truths, when they are truths, expressed in "religious" dogmas are not, properly speaking, *religious* at all, but scientific, historical, or philosophical.

Thus we need not place our trust in dogmas, ancient or modern, as satisfactory expressions of religious truths; those truths are not capable of being expressed in any such form. They may be expressed, perhaps, in paradoxes, parables, myths, but not in dogmas. And the seat of religious truth is not a dogma or system of dogma, but the individual who knows—the expert, as in science and art. And he can only enlighten those who are capable of being enlightened—*i.e.*, who possess in some measure his faculty of religious perception.

Thus the problem of providing a genuine religious authority or source of religious truth (as contrasted with the spurious authority of the exponents of dogma) resolves itself into the problem of how to provide a supply of individuals who will possess religious insight, and therefore knowledge in the sphere of religion. But how can a supply of such enlightened individuals be assured?

Needless to say, such individuals cannot be trained so easily as chemists or technicians. All that can be done is to provide such conditions as are likely to be favourable to the emergence of such individuals, and to trust that they will appear. And here we may consider the relations of the individual to his tradition—*i.e.*, to his cultural background.

There is, of course, no such thing as a completely independent individual. The individual is as much the product of the society to which he belongs as the acorn is of the oak tree; and all his life he is as dependent upon society as the oak tree is upon the soil and the atmosphere from which it derives nutriment. Thus the individual possessing religious insight is the product of the religious tradition to which he belongs and to which he owes his knowledge. But this is only one side of the truth, though it is the side most usually emphasized. If it is true that the individual is dependent upon his tradition, it is also true that the tradition is dependent upon the individuals who embody it. But for them it could not even be preserved, still less enriched. And a tradition which is not perpetually being renewed and enriched is in decay, for growth and decay are the only possible alternatives.

And now to examine the conditions which are favourable to the production of the type of individual who can not only embody but enrich the tradition to which he belongs. Two such conditions may be mentioned as being indispensable. The first is freedom to think and to express convictions; only so can diversity, which is the source of creative advances, be assured. All evolution has taken place through a diversity of variations; and this applies in the sphere of human culture as well as in the sphere of biology. All standardization, at which our official religious institutions appear to aim to-day for the sake of " efficiency " and safety, is unfavourable to the emergence of creative individuals; all possible growing points are nipped off prematurely lest they spoil the shape of the bush. It is certainly no accident (as was pointed out by the late Canon Charles) that the Old Testament, the deposit of a very rich religious tradition —one which later produced two of the great world religions, Christianity and Mohammedanism—contains material of a very diverse character written by men who challenged the accepted religious ideas of their time. Job, Jonah, Ruth, Ecclesiastes, are not the works of standardized or orthodox writers. The prophets, too, gave forcible and eloquent expression to what was clearly minority opinion. Had there been among the Hebrews the rigid standards of orthodoxy now considered so essential, many of these creative ideas would have never emerged, or have been suppressed if they had.

The second condition necessary for the production of creative individuals with religious insight is the deliberate making of co-operative efforts to produce them. This has been done in times past by forming communities the object of which has been the development of the mental, moral, and spiritual faculties of their individual members. The earlier Hebrew prophets would seem to have been products of communities known as the schools of the prophets, or the sons of the prophets; and the later prophets were their lineal descendants and inheritors of the same tradition. We may suppose that these schools had developed some kind of esoteric knowledge, as well as techniques for the development of telepathy, prevision, clairvoyance, and so on, for that such powers existed among them is clear from the biblical narratives—unless we are to regard these as entirely untrustworthy. John the Baptist was very probably a member of an ascetic Essene community. At a later age

the various monastic orders and orders of friars were schools and training centres of religious practice and experience, and without these power-houses medieval Christianity would scarcely have attained the high levels which were actually reached. Similarly the Celtic Christian communities associated with the name of St Columba produced a type of spiritually and intellectually developed individual, who made the ideal missionary among wild and savage peoples. Well would it have been for Europe if its evangelization had been wholly in their hands; as it was they penetrated to Germany, Switzerland, Italy. Similarly the Jesuit Order produced individuals who could influence European rulers and govern the simple tribes of South America with equal skill and imagination.

It is true that the descendants of these communities still exist among us, but it would appear that their concern now is to preserve rather than to create; they are predominantly conservative in character. Perhaps some Benedictine foundations such as Downside may be regarded as exceptions, if they can produce such guides in the spiritual life as the late Dom Chapman. But it would seem that the work of the more orthodox religious communities needs to be supplemented by the activities of groups recruited from wider circles, groups which will not be afraid of making experiments. Such communities could hardly help increasing our knowledge in the religious sphere, and so helping to provide a new type of authority in it. Such an authority, proceeding from knowledge acquired by experiment and experience, would prove more satisfying to the modern world than the type at present claiming our allegiance on grounds of supernatural inspiration. Historical inquiry has made it plain how such claims came to be made and maintained.

The weakness of much traditional religious authority to-day is that it does not appeal to present experience so much as to the alleged experiences of men of the remote past, which from the nature of the case cannot be checked. But it is important that religion should be a matter of present experience and not merely of past history. We may note that the appeal of Christian Science lies in the fact that it is a religion of present experience, of contemporary and not of old-time miracle. Thus though it may lack the support of scientists and scholars, it appeals to a large body of ordinary people who feel the need of a religion to give

them health and strength here and now. Here too lay the appeal of primitive Christianity; it was a religion of present experience. Few of its early converts were interested in history; in any case the future interested them more than the past.

Now it is clear that a religion of present experience is bound to find its authority in those individuals who themselves have the experience in question and are acquainted with the disciplines and methods through which it can be attained, and who possess the enlightenment which accompanies it. And it is they, and the groups which include them, that will be the seat of authority in religion, just as a group like the British Association may be regarded as one seat of authority in science. It should be noted that, though scientific authority is strong, it is not based upon the claim of any scientific corporation to possess supernatural knowledge, and nothing is put forward on scientific authority but what can be submitted to the test of experience. In the sphere of science we hear of no demand for a return to the authority of the past, because sufficient authority is already present, and is recognized by everyone. It is generally agreed that if men of science were found to be pleading for a return to the authority of the past—to the authority of pre-Darwinian biology for example—on any other basis than the discovery of new evidence, it would be an indication that science was in decay. The parallel suggests that the demand for a retreat wholly to ancient authority in religion is a sign of a similar decadence and lack of creative activity in the religious sphere.

At present religious institutions are voicing a demand for a retreat to an old authority rather than an advance to a new one. Such an attitude is based on the view that in the sphere of religious truth no further advances are possible. It should be noted that this view posits the existence of a profound qualitative difference between religious and all other forms of human activity. And it would appear to be a theory of an *a priori* character, not based upon experience. There is no proof to be found in history that no further advances in religious knowledge are possible. There is no proof that man's capacities for spiritual understanding will not increase. It would generally be admitted that in the past advances have been made, and this creates the presupposition that further advances are still possible. Religious institutions should aim at producing the type of individual

capable of contributing to those advances. If such individuals were forthcoming, there would be no lack of a genuine religious authority, and one that would be widely recognized, not one that is conventionally accepted, where it is accepted at all, as is the case with the authority of religious institutions as constituted at present.

J. C. HARDWICK.

Peace Proposals for Brother Every and Mr Bethell

I BELIEVE there is little real disagreement between my critics (Brother Every and Mr Bethell) and myself. Mr Carritt, who does not accept the Christian premisses, must here be left out of account, though with all the respect and affection I feel for my old tutor and friend.

The conclusion I reached in THEOLOGY, March, 1940, was that culture, though not in itself meritorious, was innocent and pleasant, might be a vocation for some, was helpful in bringing certain souls to Christ, and could be pursued to the glory of God. I do not see that Brother Every and Mr Bethell really want me to go beyond this position.

The argument of Mr Bethell's paper in THEOLOGY, July, 1939 (excluding its historical section, which does not here concern us), was that the deepest, and often unconscious, beliefs of a writer were implicit in his work, even in what might seem the minor details of its style, and that, unless we were Croceans, such beliefs must be taken into account in estimating the value of that work. In THEOLOGY, May, 1940, Mr Bethell reaffirmed this doctrine, with the addition that the latent beliefs in much modern fiction were naturalistic, and that we needed trained critics to put Christian readers on their guard against this pervasive influence.

Brother Every, in THEOLOGY, September, 1940, maintained that our tastes are symptomatic of our real standards of value, which may differ from our professed standards; and that we needed trained critics to show us the real

latent standards in literature—in fact " to teach us how to read ".

I cannot see that my own doctrine and those of my critics come into direct contradiction at any point. My fear was lest excellence in reading and writing were being elevated into a spiritual value, into something meritorious *per se*; just as other things excellent and wholesome in themselves, like conjugal love (in the sense of *eros*) or physical cleanliness, have, at some times and in some circles, been confused with virtue itself or esteemed necessary parts of it. But it now appears that my critics never intended to make any such claim. Bad taste for them is not itself spiritual evil but the symptom which betrays, or the " carrier " which circulates, spiritual evil. And the spiritual evil thus betrayed or carried turns out not to be any specifically cultural or literary kind of evil, but false beliefs or standards—that is, intellectual error or moral baseness; and as I never intended to deny that error and baseness were evils nor that literature could imply and carry them, I think that all three of us may shake hands and say we are agreed. I do not mean to suggest that my critics have *merely* restated a platitude which neither I nor anyone else ever disputed. The value of their contribution lies in their insistence that the real beliefs may differ from the professed and may lurk in the turn of a phrase or the choice of an epithet; with the result that many preferences which seem to the ignorant to be simply " matters of taste " are visible to the trained critic as choices between good and evil, or truth and error. And I fully admit that this important point had been neglected in my essay of March, 1940. Now that it has been made, I heartily accept it. I think this is agreement.

But to test the depth of agreement I would like my critics to consider the following positions. By agreement I mean only agreement in our doctrines. Differences of temper and emphasis between Christian critics are inevitable and probably desirable.

1. Is it the function of the " trained critic " to discover the latent beliefs and standards in a book, or to pass judgment on them when discovered, or both? I think Brother Every confines the critic's function to discovery. About Mr Bethell I am not so sure. When he says (THEOLOGY, May, 1940, p. 360) that we need a minority of trained critics to " lay bare the false values of contemporary

culture" this might mean two things: (*a*) "To expose the falsity of the values of contemporary culture"; (*b*) "To reveal what the values of contemporary culture actually are—and, by the way, I personally think those values false." It is necessary to clear this up before we know what is meant by a "trained critic". Trained in what? A man who has had a literary training may be an expert in disengaging the beliefs and values latent in literature; but the judgment on those beliefs and values (that is, the judgment on all possible human thoughts and moralities) belongs either to a quite different set of experts (theologians, philosophers, casuists, scientists) or else not to experts at all but to the unspecialized "good and wise man", the φρόνιμος. Now I for my part have no objection to our doing both when we criticize, but I think it very important to keep the two operations distinct. In the discovery of the latent belief we have had a special training, and speak as experts; in the judgment of the beliefs, once they have been discovered, we humbly hope that we are being trained, like everyone else, by reason and ripening experience, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, as long as we live, but we speak on them simply as men, on a level with all our even-Christians, and indeed with less authority than any illiterate man who happens to be older, wiser, and purer, than we. To transfer to these judgments any specialist authority which may belong to us as "trained critics" is charlatanism, if the attempt is conscious, and confusion if it is not. If Brother Every (see THEOLOGY, September, 1940, p. 161) condemns a book because of "English Liberal" implications he is really saying two things: (*a*) This book has English Liberal implications; (*b*) English Liberalism is an evil. The first he utters with authority because he is a trained critic. In the second, he may be right or he may be wrong; but he speaks with no more authority than any other man. Failure to observe this distinction may turn literary criticism into a sort of stalking horse from behind which a man may shoot all his personal opinions on any and every subject, without ever really arguing in their defence and under cover of a quite irrelevant specialist training in literature. I do not accuse Brother Every of this. But a glance at any modern review will show that it is an ever-present danger.

2. In THEOLOGY, May, 1940 (p. 359), Mr Bethell speaks of "some form of biological or economic naturalism" as

the unconscious attitude in most popular fiction of to-day, and cites, as straws that show the wind, the popularity of " urges " and " overmastering passions ". Now, fortunately, I agree with Mr Bethell in thinking naturalism an erroneous philosophy: and I am ready to grant, for the purposes of argument, that those who talk about " urges " do so because they are unconsciously naturalistic. But when all this has been granted, can we honestly say that the *whole* of our dislike of " urges " is explained, without remainder, by our disagreement with naturalism? Surely not. Surely we object to that way of writing for another reason *as well*—because it is so worn, so facile, so obviously attempting to be impressive, so associated in our minds with dullness and pomposity.[1] In other words, there are two elements in our reaction. One is the detection of an attitude in the writer which, as instructed Christians and amateur philosophers, we disapprove; the other is really, and strictly, an affair of taste. Now these, again, require to be kept distinct. Being fallen creatures we tend to resent offences against our taste, at least as much as, or even more than, offences against our conscience or reason; and we would dearly like to be able—if only we can find any plausible argument for doing so—to inflict upon the man whose writing (perhaps for reasons utterly unconnected with good and evil) has afflicted us like a bad smell, the same kind of condemnation which we can inflict on him who has uttered the false and the evil. The tendency is easily observed among children; friendship wavers when you discover that a hitherto trusted playmate actually *likes* prunes. But even for adults it is " sweet, sweet, sweet poison " to feel able to imply " thus saith the Lord " at the end of every expression of our pet aversions. To avoid this horrible danger we must perpetually try to distinguish, however closely they get entwined both by the subtle nature of the facts and by the secret importunity of our passions, those attitudes in a writer which we can honestly and confidently condemn as real evils, and those qualities in his writing which simply annoy and offend us as men of taste. This is difficult, because the latter are often so much more

[1] Pomp is at times a literary virtue. Pomposity (the unsuccessful attempt at pomp) may, of course, spring from an evil (pride); it may also be the maladroit effort of a humble writer to " rise " to a subject which he honestly feels to be great.

obvious and provoke such a very violent response. The only safe course seems to me to be this: to reserve our condemnation of attitudes for attitudes universally acknowledged to be bad by the Christian conscience speaking in agreement with Scripture and ecumenical tradition. A bad book is to be deemed a real evil in so far as it can be shown to prompt to sensuality, or pride, or murder, or to conflict with the doctrine of Divine Providence, or the like. The other dyslogistic terms dear to critics (vulgar, derivative, cheap, precious, academic, affected, bourgeois, Victorian, Georgian, " literary," etc.) had better be kept strictly on the taste side of the account. In discovering what attitudes are present you can be as subtle as you like. But in your theological and ethical condemnation (as distinct from your dislike of the taste) you had better be very un-subtle. You had better reserve it for plain mortal sins, and plain atheism and heresy. For our passions are always urging us in the opposite direction, and if we are not careful criticism may become a mere excuse for taking revenge on books whose smell we dislike by erecting our temperamental antipathies into pseudo-moral judgments.

3. In practical life a certain amount of " reading between the lines " is necessary: if we took every letter and every remark simply at its face value we should soon find ourselves in difficulties. On the other hand, most of us have known people with whom " reading between the lines " became such a mania that they overlooked the obvious truth of every situation and lived in the perpetual discovery of mares' nests; and doctors tell us of a form of lunacy in which the simplest remark uttered in the patient's presence becomes to him evidence of a conspiracy and the very furniture of his cell takes on an infinitely sinister significance. Will my critics admit that the subtle and difficult task of digging out the latent beliefs and values, however necessary, is attended with some danger of our neglecting the obvious and surface facts about a book, whose importance, even if less than that of the latent facts, is certainly much higher than zero? Suppose two books A and B. Suppose it can be truly said of A: " The very style of this book reveals great sensitivity and honesty, and a readiness for total commitments; excellent raw material for sanctity if ever the author were converted." And suppose it can be truly said of B: " The very style of this book betrays a woolly, compromising state of mind,

knee-deep entangled in the materialistic values which the author thinks he has rejected." But might it not also be true to say of book A, " Despite its excellent latent implications, its ostensible purpose (which will corrupt thousands of readers) is the continued glorification of mortal sin "; and of B, " Despite its dreadful latent materialism, it does set courage and fidelity before the reader in an attractive light, and thousands of readers will be edified (though much less edified than they suppose) by reading it "? And is there not a danger of this second truth being neglected? We want the abstruse knowledge *in addition to* the obvious: not *instead of* it.

4. It is clear that the simple and ignorant are least able to resist, by reason, the influence of latent evil in the books they read. But is it not also true that this is often balanced by a kind of protection which comes to them through ignorance itself? I base this on three grounds: (*a*) Adults often disquiet themselves about the effect of a work upon children—for example, the effect of the bad elements in *Peter Pan*, such as the desire not to grow up or the sentimentalities about Wendy. But if I may trust my own memory, childhood simply does not receive these things. It rightly wants and enjoys the flying, the Indians, and the pirates (not to mention the pleasure of being in a theatre at all), and just accepts the rest as part of the meaningless " roughage " which occurs in all books and plays; for at that age we never expect any work of art to be interesting all through. (When I began writing stories in exercise books I tried to put off all the things I really wanted to write about till at least the second page—I thought it wouldn't be like a real grown-up book if it became interesting at once.) (*b*) I often find expressions in my pupils' essays which seem to me to imply a great deal of latent error and evil. Now, since it would, in any case, be latent, one does not expect them to own up to it when challenged. But one does expect that a process of exploration would discover the mental atmosphere to which the expression belonged. But in my experience exploration often produces a conviction that it had, in my pupils' minds, no evil associations, because it had no associations at all. They just thought it was the ordinary way of translating thought into what they suppose to be " literary English ". Thousands of people are no more corrupted by the implications of " urges ", " dynamism ", and " progressive " than they are

edified by the implications of "secular", "charity", and "Platonic".[1] The same process of attrition which empties good language of its virtue does, after all, empty bad language of much of its vice.[2] (*c*) If one speaks to an uneducated man about some of the worst features in a film or a book, does he not often reply unconcernedly, "Ah . . . they always got to bring a bit of that into a film," or, "I reckon they put that in to wind it up like"? And does this not mean that he is aware, even to excess, of the difference between art and life? He *expects* a certain amount of meaningless nonsense—which expectation, though very regrettable from the cultural point of view, largely protects him from the consequences of which we, in our sophisticated naivety, are afraid.

5. Finally, I agree with Brother Every that our leisure, even our play, is a matter of serious concern. There is no neutral ground in the universe: every square inch, every split second, is claimed by God and counterclaimed by Satan. But will Brother Every agree in acknowledging a real difficulty about merely recreational reading (I do not include all reading under this head), as about games? I mean that they are serious, and yet, to do them at all, we must somehow do them as if they were not. It is a serious matter to choose wholesome recreations: but they would no longer be recreations if we pursued them seriously. When Mr Bethell speaks of the critic's "working hours" (May, 1940, p. 360) I hope he means his hours of criticism, not his hours of reading. For a great deal (not all) of our literature was made to be read lightly, for entertainment. If we do not read it, in a sense, "for fun" and with our feet on the fender, we are not using it as it was meant to be used, and all our criticism on it will be pure illusion. For you cannot judge any artefact except by using it as it was intended. It is no good judging a butter-knife by seeing whether it will saw logs. Much bad criticism, indeed,

[1] For example, God forbid that when Mr Bethell (May, 1940, p. 361) uses "old-fashioned" as a dyslogistic term we should immediately conclude that he really had the garage or dressmaking philosophy (Madam would like the *latest* model) which his words suggest. We know it slipped out by a sort of accident, for which *veniam petimus damusque vicissim*.

[2] This applies also to "bad language" in the popular sense, obscenity or profanity. The custom of such language has its origin in sin, but to the individual speaker it may be mere meaningless noise.

results from the efforts of critics to get a work-time result out of something that never aimed at producing more than pleasure. There is a real problem here, and I do not see my way through it. But I should be disappointed if my critics denied the existence of the problem.

If any real disagreement remains between us, I anticipate that it will be about my third point—about the distinction there drawn between the real spiritual evil carried or betrayed in a book and its mere faults of taste. And on this subject I confess that my critics can present me with a very puzzling dilemma. They can ask me whether the statement, " This is tawdry writing ", is an objective statement describing something bad in a book and capable of being true or false, or whether it is merely a statement about the speaker's own feelings—different in form, but fundamentally the same, as the proposition " I don't like oysters ". If I choose the latter, then most criticism becomes purely subjective—which I don't want. If I choose the former then they can ask me, " What are these qualities in a book which you admit to be in some sense good and bad but which, you keep on warning us, are not ' really ' or ' spiritually ' good and bad? Is there a kind of good which is not good? Is there any good that is not pleasing to God or any bad which is not hateful to Him?" And if you press me along these lines I end in doubts. But I will not get rid of those doubts by falsifying the little light I already have. That little light seems to compel me to say that there are two kinds of good and bad. The first, such as virtue and vice or love and hatred, besides being good or bad themselves make the possessor good or bad. The second do not. They include such things as physical beauty or ugliness, the possession or lack of a sense of humour, strength or weakness, pleasure or pain. But the two most relevant for us are the two I mentioned at the beginning of this essay, conjugal *eros* (as distinct from *agape*, which, of course, is a good of the first class) and physical cleanliness. Surely we have all met people who said, indeed, that the latter was *next* to godliness, but whose unconscious attitude made it a *part* of godliness, and no small part? And surely we agree that any good of this second class, however good on its own level, becomes an enemy when it thus assumes demoniac pretensions and erects itself into a quasi-spiritual value. As M. de Rougemont has recently told us, the conjugal *eros* " ceases to be a devil only when it ceases to be a

god ". My whole contention is that in literature, in addition to the spiritual good and evil which it carries, there is also a good and evil of this second class, a properly cultural or literary good and evil, which must not be allowed to masquerade as good and evil of the first class. And I shall feel really happy about all the minor differences between my critics and me when I find in them some recognition of this danger—some admission that they and I, and all of the like education, are daily tempted to a kind of idolatry.

I am not pretending to know how this baffling phenomenon —the two kinds or levels of good and evil—is to be fitted into a consistent philosophy of values. But it is one thing to be unable to explain a phenomenon, another to ignore it. And I admit that all of these lower goods ought to be encouraged, that, as pedagogues, it is our duty to try to make our pupils happy and beautiful, to give them cleanly habits and good taste; and the discharge of that duty is, of course, a good of the first class. I will admit, too, that evils of this second class are often the result and symptom of real spiritual evil; dirty finger-nails, a sluggish liver, boredom, and a bad English style, may often in a given case result from disobedience, laziness, arrogance, or intemperance. But they may also result from poverty or other misfortune. They may even result from virtue. The man's ears may be unwashed behind or his English style borrowed from the jargon of the daily press, because he has given to good works the time and energy which others use to acquire elegant habits or good language. Gregory the Great, I believe, vaunted the barbarity of his style. Our Lord ate with unwashed hands.

I am stating, not solving, a problem. If my critics want to continue the discussion I think they can do so most usefully by taking it right away from literature and the arts to some other of these mysterious " lower goods "—where, probably, all our minds will work more coolly. I should welcome an essay from Brother Every or Mr Bethell on conjugal *eros* or personal cleanliness. My dilemma about literature is that I admit bad taste to be, in some sense, " a bad thing ", but do not think it *per se* " evil ". My critics will probably say the same of physical dirt. If we could thrash the problem out on the neutral ground of clean and dirty fingers, we might return to the battlefield of literature with new lights.

I hope it is now unnecessary to point out that in denying "taste" to be a spiritual value, I am not for a moment suggesting, as Mr Bethell thought (May, 1940, p. 357), that it comes "under God's arbitrary condemnation". I enjoyed my breakfast this morning, and I think that was a good thing and do not think it was condemned by God. But I do not think myself a good man for enjoying it. The distinction does not seem to me a very fine one.

C. S. Lewis.

Alice Ottley: A Grateful Memory

Alice Ottley became the first headmistress of the school at Worcester that now bears her name, at the choice of its founder, Canon W. J. Butler, formerly of Wantage, on June 20, 1883. She died on September 18, 1912, the day upon which the school began its first term under her successor. An account of her life, written by one of her staff from long and intimate knowledge, was published in 1914;[1] and there are many both of her staff and of her children who can bear record of her from a far closer intimacy than lies behind what follows here. The object of this article is therefore not to repeat what many know and any can read for themselves, but to focus attention upon a single feature of her life and work—namely, her amazing power of instilling vital religious principles into children upon whom, by reason of their lack of spiritual development, religious teaching *per se* had for the time being little effect. The writer, who was in the school for nine years and is qualified to speak on this point simply because she was herself just such a child, submits these reminiscences in the centenary year of Miss Ottley's birth, in thankful acknowledgment of an immeasurable debt and in the hope that other shepherds of black and unresponsive sheep may be encouraged by the example of this great educator, who saw so clearly that, though God alone can send the fire from heaven, He looks to man to build the altar and prepare the offering, against that day.

The Worcester High School for Girls, as it was then called, was and still is essentially a day school, most of its pupils being residents in or near the city and the remainder

[1] *Alice Ottley: a Memoir*, by M. E. James (Longmans).

living during the term either with other families or in one of the boarding-houses run for the school but under separate management. We were thus under Miss Ottley's rule only in school hours: out of them, some of us in our most impressionable years came under influences very different from hers. Moreover, though it was definitely a Church school and she herself a Tractarian, there were Dissenting as well as Evangelical toes that must not be trodden on, and the Divinity teaching certainly did not err on the side of doctrinal definition. How was it that, in spite of these handicaps, the little lady in the blue dress and the lace cap wrought so marvellously for our lasting good?

First and last, the answer lies in what she was herself. She had the irresistible assurance of authority which results when complete natural self-mistrust surrenders itself to equally complete conviction of vocation. It was God's school, we were God's children, objects therefore of utmost reverence, for all our subjection, and He had given us to her to train for Him. She was utterly consecrated, entirely single-minded, and flamingly consistent. There was for her nothing irrelevant, no separation of sacred and secular; all was God's, and every detail of the school's life, as of her own, was ordered with intention to His will. You might be without spiritual sense, complex-ridden, and everything else that makes a child difficult and tardy, but "religion—*that which binds*" was in the very air you breathed. Let us consider in some detail how this was.

First, there was the system of discipline, extraordinarily severe by modern standards and yet maintained with remarkable evenness and absence of strain throughout the school. (Incidentally, how much this says not only for Miss Ottley but for her staff!) The rule of silence during school hours, in and between classes, in the cloakrooms and in going from one part of the building to another, was absolute, and the smallest breach of it meant an order or bad mark. The same resulted for such offences as failure to have any book or tool at the time it was wanted, having your desk untidy or—worst of all—doing your corrections carelessly or not at all. On this last point Miss Ottley was adamant. The rule was *Corrections before New Work*, and to leave a space in which to do them afterwards was forbidden, not because of the risk of forgetting them, but because it was disobedient. For the same reason, the rule being that margins were to be ruled in pencil, the width of your ruler,

ink margins and those of a width to suit the individual fancy were severely censured. "*O*-bedience, not *Ub*-bedience," she would say, making us repeat the word after her, that was what mattered; and in a dim sort of way we knew that it mattered for us and to her only because it mattered to God. In this way she taught us by degrees not only to hate a ragged rule but really to appreciate the freedom that comes with self-control and to prefer cosmos to chaos in every department of life. The number of bad marks gained seems amazingly small in retrospect; a modern child in disorderly mood will pick up ten in a week, but at Worcester one was covered with shame if one had four in a term, and some girls would go the full year without any. Miss Ottley made a tremendous point also of neatness and accuracy: "What is worth doing at all is worth doing well" was a favourite dictum; and the system by which "three tens running" for flawless written work in a single subject counted as an "Excellent", publicly announced and displayed in the vestibule at break, made for a high standard in these respects. Over our handwriting she kept a personal watch; copybooks were given out by herself alone, and during the year she called in the exercise books of every form at a week-end, and delivered pungent and unforgettable criticism thereon during the week following. Yet with all this she was never petty, nor was her discipline galling, since even for those who stood most in awe of her her devoted love for us and her essential bigness made themselves felt. There was vision behind all she did. For instance, it was her own worshipping, wondering awe at the God-given faculty of speech that prompted her insistence on careful reading, clear enunciation and good choice of words, long before elocution was heard of as a school subject; and she inculcated a monastic care of property, whether it was textbooks which, carefully covered in linen, belonged to the school and were only "lent" to us, or our personal goods, for any misuse of things committed to our care was a breach of stewardship of something that ultimately was God's alone. Again, it was because her whole life was lived in such conscious relation to God that her standard of truth was so absolute and so unhesitatingly accepted. Conduct marks, given only for grave faults such as any sort of cheating or untruthfulness, were extremely rare, and we regarded them as so unspeakably dreadful that a girl who had had even one in

her school career must have had hard work to live it down. She was however scrupulously fair, and the writer remembers gratefully how, when a particularly terrifying mistress sent her, at the age of ten or eleven, trembling to the Head on the charge of telling a lie, Miss Ottley after inquiry realized that the mistress was in error and sent the child back acquitted. " I can't disbelieve that," she said, and the child herself was not more glad than she. Dear Miss Ottley ! Did she realize what it meant to have it recognized that there was just one sort of crime you did not do ?

The subject of discipline calls to mind the occasions in the Big Hall, at or after Prayers, when Miss Ottley spoke to the whole school together. The chief of these was Tuesday Mark Reading, for which we moved up on to the apse above the platform on which she stood. She read the marks of several forms each week, with brief but pertinent comments, and anyone who had had a Bad Mark or a returned lesson had to stand up in front of the whole school and the staff and tell her what it was for. It was a fearful ordeal, but it did make you careful, and it helped one also to realize that no man sinneth unto himself. She spoke then also of any general matter that needed attention, never wasting words and often saying the same things, so that they sank in, yet never became stale. One not infrequent theme was manners, which, like all else, she treated in its relation to God. We were " the King's daughters ", " princesses ", and as such owed it to God, ourselves and others to behave accordingly. Her audience was of course extremely mixed socially, and it was characteristic of her that she faced the fact quite openly. " You can't all be ladies," she would say with cheerful frankness, " but you can all be gentlewomen !" Another favourite saying was that of our Founder, " Prayer, Faith and Grind will do most things "; and if some of us were too undeveloped to do much with the first two, she at any rate saw to it that we made up on the third. Here are some instances. If we were away from school for any reason short of real illness or contagious quarantine, our homework was sent to us and, even when quite young, we were expected to do our best with it, although we had missed the lessons. Again, our natural aptitudes were ground rather for mortification than for encouragement; in drawing class our noses were kept severely to the grind-stone of models and perspective, flowers for home-work being allowed only as an occasional treat; it really was

regarded almost as a sin to draw what you *liked* ! Similarly, when a benevolent oculist prescribed less work, it was the subjects you enjoyed that were taken off and those you were bad at that remained. This was, however, far from being a merely negative and repressive policy, as a personal reminiscence will show. The writer had always been extremely weak at arithmetic, and mathematics, when begun, proved equally difficult. Finally, at thirteen, the then subject mistress gave her up in despair and both algebra and Euclid were dropped. A couple of years later, however, by Miss Ottley's wish, they were resumed, from the very beginning, with another mistress, a brilliant and most patient teacher, and at seventeen a pass was obtained in Higher Certificate. The gain from having carried the mental discipline of mathematics to that point was great, but it was nothing to that of having learnt to do the seemingly impossible.

At the final Mark Reading of the term, Miss Ottley always told us how to behave in the holidays. During term we often sang the hymn:

> At Thy feet, O Christ, we lay
> Thine own gift of this new day.

Now we were reminded that holiday time, no less than term, was God's time and that we were answerable to Him for our use of it. We were therefore to relax but not to slacken, to enjoy ourselves wholeheartedly but unselfishly and with restraint, not omitting to help our mothers darn our brothers' socks and *never* reading story books before the afternoon. Here again Prayers supplied the text, in words that always come to mind, in Miss Ottley's beautiful voice followed by the answering chorus of the school:

℣. Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might,
℟. That God in all things may be glorified.

Before Christmas and Easter we had some seasonal teaching too; once she gave us the hymn " Father, let me dedicate " to learn before the new year, and the breaking up on the Tuesday in Holy Week—the Still Week, as she loved to call it, had always to be quiet and restrained. We learnt a good deal about the seasons from school prayers too, as well as great moral lessons. As has been said, the Divinity teaching, though given by devoted believers and therefore impressive in a way, was somewhat indefinite, and

also, as was probably inevitable at that date, on rather archaic lines. In nine years we never got beyond I Kings in Old Testament, nor touched the writing prophets; New Testament was equally uncritical and Doctrine as a separate subject non-existent, though there was a lesson called Prayerbook in the middle school of which memory retains, alas, only a single remark—" You a clergyman's daughter and you don't know what the Lesser Litany is!"[1] At prayers, however, the Church's year was observed in simple, effective ways—the 51st Psalm to Richard Redhead on Lent Fridays, for instance, though this was part only of a very thorough observance of that season, and nice noisy hymns for festivals, while on saints' days we further had dancing in the Big Hall instead of drill, a custom which gave even the most Protestant a friendly feeling towards the citizens of heaven. We had lovely missionary hymns and prayers too, and missionaries of all sorts from C.I.M. to U.M.C.A., for Miss Ottley was in the best sense Catholic, often came to talk to us. We supported a child somewhere in the mission field, and had a weekly working party after school, at which we made queer garments out of stiff print, and Miss Ottley read a story to us, as only she could. Sometimes it was funny and she herself would become helpless with laughter, as in *Sir Toady Lion*, over the hero's reply to Cissie's request to blow his nose, " Shan't, it's no use, won't stay blowed, it's too juicy!"; and another time it was a heart-breaking story of a little boy who went blind after an accident, and we all wept together, though no one was ever less sentimental than Miss Ottley.

Besides what we gained from all these sources, those of us who were confirmed at school had also some weeks' intensive preparation from Canon Claughton on Saturday mornings and from Miss Ottley another afternoon. Just how definite the teaching then was the writer is not competent to say, because she was not capable of taking it in and emerged at the end bitterly disappointed at not having solved the mystery of " Early Service " but quite incapable of asking questions. Nevertheless a milestone was reached. Does any other of those twelve or fourteen children remember Miss Ottley's class on March 15, 1904, the evening before our Confirmation? As she sat with her back to her sitting-room window, where the bare branches of the trees barred

[1] It was Miss Ottley who said it.

the stormy sky, we, ranged before her, could not see her face; nor does memory retain anything of what she said, save that she spoke of the morrow's Gift and of the new stage of life that we should enter with It. But to one child, at any rate, there came knowledge in that moment that there was a Reality in the world, outside her own experience, by which Miss Ottley lived. A great discovery: as when a man born blind realizes for the first time that colour exists, though not, as yet, for him. After Confirmation we had one or two more classes with Miss Ottley, in preparation for our Communicant life, and she gave us each a copy of *The Narrow Way* and of Bishop Walsham How's *Holy Communion*. This last contained self-examination questions on the Ten Commandments, and Miss Ottley impressed upon us that, though a shorter preparation might be made at other times, three times a year, before Christmas, Easter and Whitsun, we *must* go through those questions and write down the result for detailed confession to God. To one who had already been some years in the school, this injunction seemed quite natural, for it was simply the Corrections-before-New-Work principle carried over into one's inner life. It became henceforward one of the things one *ought* to do and therefore for very awe dared not omit, however much one disliked it; and though it was a barren groping business enough, it was by its means that the way opened eventually to the Sacrament of Penance and with it the Reality beyond all imagining, first dimly glimpsed in Alice Ottley herself. As school Confirmations were always in March, our First Communion on Easter Day fell in the holidays, but Miss Ottley did not relax her care for young communicants. We had a corporate Communion on Ascension Day, a much-loved festival and always a whole holiday; and those of us who lived near enough used to be invited from time to time to meet her at the school in time for the eight o'clock Celebration at St Oswald's on a Sunday, and return with her to a *tête-à-tête* breakfast, followed by the *Christian Year* and *Lyra Innocentium* for the day.

No account of Alice Ottley and her school would be complete without some mention of the two years spent in her Sixth Form. At sixteen, having outlived the sorrows of adolescence and the middle school and passed the "Lower Board", which was the then equivalent of School Certificate, even the blackest sheep had achieved respectability, and Miss Ottley, wise as ever, knew the value of

extended liberty. Best of all, we were allowed at last to specialize and began to get some vision of what scholarship really means. Three memories stand out of lessons in the Sixth, to which one's subsequent debt has been very great. The first is of hours spent in the Butler Library—now our privileged domain, though woe betide you if you forgot to put back your chair or to replace the Lewis and Short !—puzzling out Latin proses in absorbed delight, grateful indeed now that one's earlier pleadings to " give up Latin " had not been heeded. The second is of doing geology as our science subject, and from it getting, as it was intended that we should, the first dim vision of God's purpose in creation; and the third is of what we always called " Miss Ottley's Divinity." In our first year in the Sixth, the set book for Higher Certificate was the Epistle to the Ephesians; Miss Ottley used Bishop Gore's book in teaching us, and the Greek text, and besides making us learn the Greek alphabet and many of St Paul's key words, *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*, for instance, and the pairs *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή* and *σῶμα*, *σάρξ*, she made us feel that we should be poor creatures if we did not learn New Testament Greek properly at the first opportunity! We made the most of our scanty knowledge in the exam, and one of us actually got " Religious Knowledge *with Greek Text* " on her certificate, much to the amusement of us all, though of course a different paper would have been taken for that really. But we certainly got a strong incentive towards serious Bible study in the future. The effect of those lessons on the writer at the time was, however, very different from that of Latin and geology, though no less valuable in its way. The glorious mystery of the Body of Christ was home ground to Alice Ottley, as it was to St Paul, but to an unawakened hobbledehoy the value of her splendid teaching lay chiefly in the fact that it quickened the sense of blindness and therefore of the need of sight. One had caught up at mathematics, and in all other subjects one's feet were now on firm ground; here alone, though one could get tolerable marks in term and pass in the exam, there was no vital grasp of the subject: in face of her eloquence and enthusiasm one simply felt like a dog on the wrong side of the door. Another contact with the Head in the Sixth Form was Tennyson Tea, to which she invited us after school on Fridays, whenever she was free. We ate a polite tea in her dining-room, and then sat round on the floor and elsewhere while she read, with comments, the *Idylls of the*

King. Other people might single out different features of our school life as particularly memorable, but surely all who survived to the Sixth would agree as to our immense indebtedness to it. We had perhaps fewer outlets on the artistic and imaginative side than would be thought desirable to-day; but we got plenty of matter and stimulus, and the persistent training in thoroughness and concentration ensured a firm soil for imagination to grow from in later years. We acquired, too, a sound corporate sense, and reaped the firstfruit of it in the Upper Sixth in an unforgettable experience of common life. The school motto, *Candida rectaque*, Clean and straight, gave us an ideal of life like a blank cheque, capable of being filled up to any amount; and above all we learnt from Miss Ottley that we owed it to God, who gave them, to develop all our powers to the uttermost, and that to attempt to live one's life in independence of His purpose was to be less than human. How eloquent she was on that theme, how she loved to apply the Parable of the Talents to our case, stressing the tragedy of the man who, because he had but one, did nothing with it, and how she drove home the lesson of vocation as the one thing in life to find and to fulfil ! We did not, of course, know when we left how much we owed her, nor did she know what she had done for us. As has already been said, it is not one of her prize specimens who is writing this, and though Damascus gate was reached only ten months after leaving school, Miss Ottley never knew it and the last letter ever received from her ended " your affectionately anxious". Some of us certainly never really loved her at school, in spite of the occasional experience of her utmost tenderness, any more than at that time we really loved God, for love as we knew it seemed scarcely compatible with our respectful awe. But a better love has cast out fear in the intervening years, and there will be no barriers when we meet in Paradise. She was a Christian very great and singularly complete, one in whom the prayer of the Terce hymn was fulfilled:

> By every power, by heart and tongue,
> By act and deed, Thy praise be sung;
> Inflame with perfect love each sense,
> That others' souls may kindle thence.

O. G.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Winkel, who was in civilian life a barrister, is now serving as a First Lieutenant in the Royal Dutch Army.

The Rev. J. C. Hardwick is the Vicar of Partington, near Manchester.

Mr Lewis is a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.

The Rev. W. J. Brown is the Vicar of Dewsbury and a Canon of Wakefield Cathedral.

NOTES

May we again suggest the suitability of an annual subscription to Theology as a Christmas present? We have enough paper in hand to maintain publication with the present number of pages until the end of 1941. Subscriptions (12s. per annum) should be sent to S.P.C.K. House, Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C.2.

Dr Bussell, who was referred to by a correspondent in our July number as "the late F. W. Bussell", writes as follows: "I am to-day prepared to believe nearly *every* and *any* thing; but this fact has, I fear, escaped me."

A GUILD OF CHRISTIAN SCHOLARS

(*Note*: The following statement was prepared for the recently organized American Guild of Christian Scholars, and was presented by President William A. Eddy of Hobart College to the General Convention of the American Episcopal Church this autumn. The Guild, founded a year ago by a group of American college and university professors and lecturers, is composed of loyal churchmen who are engaged in academic work [with two exceptions these are laymen]. Its objects are sufficiently stated in the document here presented. The paper was drawn up by Professor Theodore Meyer Greene, Jr, of the Princeton University Department of Philosophy, in consultation with a number of other members of the Guild, and has received the approval of the entire membership. It seems a singularly important document, especially at such a time as the present.)

BASIC OBJECTIVES

I. The Vocation of the Christian Scholar and Teacher

Historic Christianity has always expressed itself in three essential ways—in worship, in doctrine, and in conduct. Each of these is of major importance—the act of worship, as the Christian's individual and corporate communion with Deity; doctrine,

both historical and systematic, as the Christian's conceptual articulation of his beliefs; conduct, as the Christian's attempt to exemplify the Christian spirit in his daily life. The health and power of the Church depends to-day, as it has in the past, upon the expressiveness and vitality of its forms of worship, the clarity and cogency of its doctrine, and the effectiveness of the Gospel in motivating and directing human conduct.

It goes without saying that both the clergy and the laity have distinctive contributions to make to the corporate life of the Church in each of these three fields. The responsibility of the clergy is partly liturgical and sacramental, partly theological and homiletic, and partly ethical. The corporate responsibility of the laity is correspondingly diverse. All Christian laymen are under obligation to participate in corporate worship and to exemplify Christian principles in their daily conduct. The layman is also under obligation to articulate his beliefs theologically to the best of his ability. For in the absence of such articulation, worship and conduct must both fail to express the spirit and temper of the Christian faith. The clergy must continue to provide leadership in this theological domain. But it is precisely at this intellectual level that scholars and teachers among the laity have a unique responsibility and opportunity.

The distinctive task of the lay Christian scholar is to help to clarify the central tenets of historic Christianity, as embodied most adequately in the Nicene Creed, and to exhibit the relation of the secular and the religious to one another. It is his task to demonstrate the relevance of Christian doctrine to secular life and pursuits; it is equally his task to demonstrate the contribution of secular achievement to the larger Christian enterprise. He should, as scholar and teacher, ensure the appropriate recognition by the secular mind of the nature and import of the Christian faith; he should also assist the Christian theologian to do the fullest justice to the work of the secular intellect, both for its own sake and as contributing, directly or indirectly, to Christian thought and experience.

II. The Teaching and Preaching of Christianity on the Academic Campus

We should accordingly apply ourselves resolutely to the attainment of these objectives in the following ways:

1. We should attempt to promote among our academic colleagues a far greater realization than exists at present that a knowledge of historic Christianity—as an event, a doctrine, and a tradition of corporate worship—constitutes a vital part of the intellectual and cultural equipment of every genuinely educated person, irrespective of his religious beliefs or disbeliefs.

This realization should express itself in the provision of as adequate an opportunity for the study of historic Christianity

in our colleges and universities as is now provided for the study of other aspects—*e.g.*, the scientific, artistic, literary, philosophical, etc.—of our cultural heritage.

Where courses in religion are already offered, we should do everything in our power to ensure the undiluted and sympathetic presentation of the Christian tradition, whatever other religious faiths are studied and whatever variants from, and criticisms of, the basic tenets of Christianity are also presented. Courses in Christianity should be taught by scholars whose own religious beliefs enable them to exhibit the reasonableness and the power of Christianity without distortion or prejudice.

2. We should impress on college preachers and chaplains the imperative need to-day for a definite and affirmative proclamation of the historic Christian faith. Only thus, we believe, can the Christian Gospel be effectively presented to undergraduates, and only thus can their spiritual need, of which they are becoming increasingly aware, be satisfied.

3. We should recognize the right and duty of Christian teachers in the secular disciplines to discover and make clear, on all appropriate occasions, the relevance of Christianity to their several subjects of instruction. If propaganda be defined as the dogmatic assertion of a single point of view and the deliberate or involuntary suppression or distortion of alternative points of view, we condemn all propaganda, whether religious or secular, as fundamentally incompatible with the academic spirit. And if evangelism be defined as the endeavour to inculcate belief through persuasion, as opposed to honest, competent, and forceful presentation, we believe that evangelism, whether religious or secular, has no place in a lecture room or a class room. As scholars, we are committed to the impartial, open-minded, and critical search for truth in all its forms; and, as teachers, we conceive it our duty to encourage at all times the student's critical exploration and evaluation of every academic subject. It is for this very reason that the religious, and, more specifically, the Christian point of view should be presented to the student on all appropriate occasions, since otherwise a predominantly secular emphasis, frequently anti-religious and anti-Christian, must result in a serious distortion of the student's total perspective. Our academic goal is enlightenment, and true enlightenment is precluded whenever the approach to a subject with religious or Christian implications is exclusively secular, or, as frequently happens, explicitly anti-religious.

"Academic objectivity", in the true sense of the term, involves a clear recognition of the basic assumptions and fundamental principles of interpretation. Whatever his subject-matter, a scholar cannot avoid making certain basic assumptions, though he may do so inadvertently, and these assumptions inevitably reflect his ultimate beliefs concerning reality and our knowledge of it. It is the duty of the scholar and teacher to make explicit

these ultimate beliefs and to exhibit them to his readers and pupils. If by academic objectivity were meant the absence of all belief and commitment, such objectivity would be unattainable, and all attempts to achieve it would be disastrous because they would involve the blurring of significant distinctions and the exclusion of all evaluations. True academic objectivity involves the clear recognition and honest presentation of the major premises and basic normative principles requisite to any coherent interpretation of any subject-matter. The Christian teacher and scholar is therefore as free, indeed, as obligated, as any other teacher and scholar to indicate his Christian beliefs whenever, and to the extent to which, these beliefs are relevant to his interpretation of the subject-matter under investigation.

III. The Importance of Secular Pursuits

Though our prime obligation in a secular world is to urge the priority of the Christian Faith, it is also our duty to promote, especially in the Christian community, due recognition of man's secular and humanistic achievements. Bearing in mind that it is only within the general framework of Christianity that secular activities can achieve genuine importance, we believe it to be part of our Christian task to foster the secular pursuit of truth in every field and to co-operate in all other constructive humanistic activities. The distinctive character and value of secular truths and humanistic achievements merit analysis and enjoyment for their own sake, and only in proportion as they are understood and fostered can they be made to contribute as richly as possible to Christian doctrine, worship, and conduct. We would emphatically deny the complete autonomy or self-sufficiency of the secular; we do not believe that the human can get along without the superhuman or that man can achieve the good life by his own unaided efforts, at however exalted a cultural plane. But we do acknowledge the importance of secular endeavour and we conceive it to be our duty, as Christian teachers and scholars, to promote the understanding and support of such endeavours, particularly within the fields of our several major academic interests.

IV. Conclusion

The task envisaged here is perennial, but it is peculiarly urgent to-day. There is a desperate need for spiritual leadership, and especially in the academic world. We are therefore determined to make a resolute effort, both individually and collectively, to preserve and clarify the profile of historic Christianity in our own thinking, writing, and teaching. To do so we must better acquaint ourselves with responsible work in the several fields of Christian scholarship, and we cordially invite scholars in our theological seminaries to assist us in this connexion. We are

also resolved to do everything in our power to promote constructive secular activities within the general fabric of Christianity and to relate, and to cause to coalesce in fuller experience, the secular and the religious without losing the distinctions between them and with due recognition of the ultimate priority of the Christian Faith.

Revised August, 1940.

BOOKS ON RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The importance of religious teaching has been emphasized in three recent leading articles in *The Times*, and although possibly the defects in the religious instruction provided in schools was somewhat exaggerated in these articles, it is generally agreed there is abundant room for improvement. The radical weakness is the lack of teachers adequately equipped spiritually and theologically; and the preparation of elaborate syllabuses of religious instruction, and their adoption, by Local Education Authorities, throw a heavy strain upon teachers whose training is not equal to the demands the syllabus makes upon them. Until the universities and training colleges, in collaboration with Local Authorities, give a primary place to religious education no far-reaching improvement can be expected. Much, of course, can be done to assist the teachers by the provision of suitable literature, and it is with some of the most recent books on religious education that this survey is concerned.

It is pleasing to observe that those two splendid educational societies of the Church, S.P.C.K. and the National Society, are co-operating in the production of "Church Educational Publications", and one of these, *The Teaching of the Book of Common Prayer* (2s.), compiled by a number of scholars, for use with agreed syllabuses, is a timely and most valuable piece of work. A serious situation has arisen in the past few years, through the transference of hundreds of thousands of scholars from church to council schools, under reorganization schemes, and the steady diminution of church schools. The only way in which church children can receive church teaching when thus transferred is by means of the Anson Bye-Law, or Section XIII of the 1936 Education Act, and this syllabus is intended to provide church teaching for such children, by supplementing the religious instruction provided in the agreed syllabus. We have examined this syllabus very carefully and have found it stimulating, accurate, and the material attractively presented. Although in practice children are not usually withdrawn from school for religious instruction elsewhere under the age of eleven, the syllabus provides material for all ages from infants to seniors, and this is helpful where an agreed syllabus is in use in a church school.

For the juniors the syllabus is concerned mainly with the church's calendar, the church and its furniture, and how God helps His children (Baptism, Confirmation, Holy Communion). The syllabus for the seniors (ages 11-15) covers a wide field, including the structure of the Book of Common Prayer, the Sacraments, missionary work, social services, Convocation, National Assembly, etc. All the material is sound and orthodox, and we therefore strongly commend the syllabus not only to teachers, but also to the clergy, who will find it exceedingly valuable. Indeed, much obscurantism would be banished if it were used as a guide for addresses to adults. The compilers of the syllabus invite suggestions for a second edition. Perhaps a section might be added on Christian Reunion, a subject of interest to adolescents.

Of a very different character are the " Teachers' Guides to Religious Education," of which so far four volumes have appeared under the general editorship of Mr E. H. Hayes (Kindergarten, *The Friend of Little Children*; Infants, *Stories of God and Jesus*; Junior, *Servants of God*; Senior, *God and Myself*. 2s. to 4s. each, Sheldon Press). These volumes are also intended to be used with agreed syllabuses, and provide an abundance of material, both biblical and historical. The compilers are well aware of the obvious criticism (to which indeed they refer) that these lessons " spoon-feed the teachers "; but they have already been proved useful in many schools, and certainly the young and inexperienced teacher will find help in these volumes. On the other hand we are doubtful of their general usefulness; the lessons appear to be overloaded; the volumes are lacking in " atmosphere "; the compilers seem to be straining after effect. For instance, in the senior volume, p. 273, " The Jesus of History " is introduced thus: " This important block of lessons," etc. It is not usual to speak of one's own lessons or writings as important. Later on the same page we read: " A girl met her Sunday school teacher one day, and saw her looking at the football results in an evening newspaper, and was genuinely amazed. ' Why, miss !' said the girl. ' *You* interested in football ! Why, I thought you were a Christian.' Such a comment indicates the general outlook of many boys and girls, and reveals their woeful misunderstanding of Jesus. . . . Let us hope that this series will make a beginning at improving such a situation by showing Him as Master of an all-round life and a dauntless Hero out-topping all others."

These volumes lack the " tone " and " quality " of the syllabus on *The Teaching of the Book of Common Prayer*.

We have received four books intended for young children. (*Stories of Jesus*, Books II and III, by W. and H. Kendrick, illustrated by E. A. Wood, 2s., Sheldon Press; *Paul : The Herald of God*, by S. Owsley, illustrated, 2s. 6d., S.P.C.K.; *The Children's Offering in Lent*, by E. Martin, 1s., National Society and S.P.C.K.) All these books are well written, admirably illustrated and pro-

duced. But we wonder, who reads these books? We much doubt if children do. Are they rarely, if ever, read Sunday school prizes? Do teachers read these books to their pupils? We have never known them to; but if they are so read what is the use of the illustrations? It seems the only value of the books is for parents to read to their children; and here let it be noted that *The Children's Offering in Lent* is specially intended for this purpose. This is indeed a very excellent purpose. But do parents read such books to their children?

"Ingenious" best describes Mr Michael Sims-Williams' *By Action and Debate*, a course for seniors on modern lines. (S.P.C.K., 2s.; Work Papers, 6d.) We strongly advise leaders of youth groups and Bible classes to study this volume (it will need some application of mind to understand), and they will be rewarded. The aim of the method is to encourage adolescents to find out things for themselves, and to give expression to religious truths by plays, debates, etc. We (humbly) suggest that Mr Sims-Williams sets himself a "work paper" on "The position of woman in Islam," since he says (p. 57) that according to the Mohammedans "Woman exists solely for man's pleasure."

In some respects the most important volume before us is *The Living Gospel* (edited by J. R. Lumb, S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.), containing forty-six lessons for youth groups and Bible classes. The contributors are five clergymen (including the editor) and three women, and they have produced an attractive and thoughtful series of lessons dealing with living issues—*e.g.*, the meaning of purpose, the judgment of the nations, concerning mass, the value of worship, witness, Christian unity, science and religion, the life everlasting. The material is sound, scholarly and clearly presented. This volume might well be used in secondary schools.

Sunday Afternoon (Parts I and II, fifty-two children's services, containing an address, prayers, lessons, hymns, etc., by Hugh Caiger, S.P.C.K., 5s.) has stood the test of the author's own experience, and no doubt will prove useful to other teachers. It is simple and straightforward, and provides a sound training in the elements of the Christian faith and worship. The disadvantage is that apparently children of all ages are taught together, and some of the explanations given are not always very certain.

Two books of prayers may conclude this survey of school literature: *Canterbury Prayer Book* (by F. J. Shirley, Headmaster of King's School, Canterbury, n.p.) and *Venite* (n.p.), drawn up by a committee of the National Society (both published by the National Society and S.P.C.K.). These volumes are worthy of study, but on the whole we find *Canterbury Prayer Book* more attractive, perhaps because drawn up by an individual and not by a committee; the private prayers are well chosen; and the "sayings of the saints" helpful. The School Bidding Prayer is full of interest; but the short chapters on the Old Testament,

and religion and science, were scarcely worth printing and seem out of place. *Venite* (sanctioned by the Archbishops and Bishops of the Provinces of Canterbury, York and Wales and the Primus of the Scottish Episcopal Church) offers a service which may be used in schools as an alternative to Matins or Evensong, and follows the sequence of Preparation, Adoration, Confession, Thanksgiving and Supplication. To test the value of the service it is necessary to share in it, and schools will discover from experience whether it promotes worship.

Finally, a word or two must be written about *A Five-Year Plan of Teaching* adopted in the Diocese of Ely (S.P.C.K., 1s.), and now presumably run its course. The syllabus deals with belief in God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, the personal life of the Christian, and social implications of Christian discipleship. An excellent list of books is added. We recommend parish priests to spend a shilling on this volume, if only to read and re-read the eloquent and scholarly exhortation composed by Chancellor Srawley, and used when the plan was officially launched.

W. J. Brown.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONFLICT IN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

I do not expect that Canon Quick remembers a tiresomely persistent student who occupied a great deal of his time at a Student Christian Movement Swanwick Conference some years ago, but I have far too lively a sense of gratitude for the trouble he then took and the help he gave me, and far too great a respect and affection for him himself, to be at all happy in finding myself in controversy with him. I should be still more unhappy if I felt that the rift between us were either as wide or as unbridgeable as he believes it to be. I am sure, however, that the only way to bridge the gap is to continue the controversy. We are all bound together by the act of the Divine Charity, and if that is borne in mind the fearless search for truth can but bring us nearer together.

Before I start to answer Canon Quick may I make one more general comment? Though for the sake of convenience we may preserve the terms "older" and "younger", as the majority of the older are in one camp and the majority of the younger are in the other, yet my private correspondence has made it abundantly clear that, as I had suspected, the division is a very rough-and-ready one. Several people old enough to be my father have expressed full agreement with my article, and one

or two younger men with whom I have been in touch come quite clearly into the " older " camp.

I am not concerned to quarrel with Canon Quick when he says that " as regards the Church there is really nothing more serious than a difference of emphasis ". He may be right, but a difference of emphasis may be very serious. There is only a difference of emphasis between those who think of the *Church* of England, and those who think of the church of *England*, yet I am sure Canon Quick would agree with me that the difference between them is of quite first-class importance.

First let me point out a difference in language between the " older " and " younger " which is, I think, of considerable importance. The " older " habitually use the word " Church " meaning the Church on earth, the younger by the word " Church " almost always mean the whole Church, militant, expectant, and triumphant; one continuous reality of which the Church on earth is but a small part, which is never thought of as a separate entity. Hence I am not happy with Canon Quick's " symbolically the outward Church is all that Mr Bruce says it is ". He does not define what he means by a symbol, and the word is used in such various senses that it is impossible for me to say whether I am really at issue with him or not, but as the word is ordinarily used it seems to me entirely inadequate. The Church is what she is by divine act. She does not represent something other than she is, yet that surely is the usual meaning of the word symbol.

I am again in difficulty over the use of words when Canon Quick speaks of the " instrumental aspect of the Church's being ". An instrument I take to be something which is used by someone to do something, and I presume Canon Quick would say that the Church is used by God to convert the world. I would agree that the Church on earth is so used, but as that for which it is used is to draw men into that relationship of sonship of God which is only possible by membership of the Body of the Son which is the Church, so the Church is only used to build up herself. The conversion of the world cannot therefore be the reason for her existence, and to speak of the instrumental aspect of *her being*, seems to me a strange use of words.

My article did not deny that the Church on earth has many things to do. Indeed, my insistence that the Church exists in her own right and not in virtue of anything that she does is partly to safeguard us from a too narrow confining of the activities of the Church's life, which, as I said in my article, are as wide as life. Not the conversion of the world alone nor the worship of God are adequate terms to cover all that the Church on earth should do, unless we expand the natural meaning of words until they become meaningless. She is concerned also with " art, politics, economics, education, agriculture and every other phase of human activity ". In all these realms she

is God's instrument, in that it is of her nature to draw all mankind in the entirety of its activities unto herself, and so to God, but as her own upbuilding is the fruit of this instrumentality, it is clear that the reason for that upbuilding and for her existence cannot be that instrumentality.

May I digress at this point in my reply to Canon Quick to answer Mr Wickham, who wants to know why one should not say both that the Church exists to perform a function in the world and that the world exists to serve the Church? The incompatibility is brought out most simply by analogy. It is true to say I eat in order to live; it is false to say I live in order to eat. So it is true to say that the Church on earth converts, worships, etc., in order to exist: these activities are proper to her life and she would cease to be the Church if she did not do them; but it is false to say that she exists in order to do them, just as false as it is to say I live in order to eat. Not only is it false in itself to say that I live in order to eat, but once one begins to think in that kind of way one inevitably starts to underestimate other necessary functions, breathing and such like. So, too, when people fall into the error of saying that the Church exists for the performance of a function, what in fact they invariably do is to limit the infinite variety of her proper interests and activities.

To turn to Canon Quick's main point. First, of course, I entirely repudiate any belief in a closed system. God is incomprehensible, and no orthodox theologian can possibly therefore commit himself to belief in a closed system of theology. I am content with Von Hügel's great phrase, " God is infinitely apprehensible and infinitely incomprehensible ".

I am sorry, too, that Canon Quick thinks my short reference to the relation of reason and revelation as " obiter dicta ". To my mind what I said follows with inevitable logic on what I had said about the Church. It is his dislike of what I said about reason that makes me virtually certain that his " difference of emphasis " is a very big difference.

For the rest, it seems to me that Canon Quick hopelessly confuses a question of theological definition with one of apologetic technique. I was writing in my article about theology. I agree with Canon Quick that in reply to the non-Christian's " I don't understand " or " I don't agree " there is a place in Christian apologetic for the retort " Of course *you* wouldn't ", but it is, I think, normally a rather small place, and it is a retort I rarely have used myself. The Christian on the mission field is almost always confronted by people whose language has as its background a definitely anti-Christian world view (by which I mean a world view which is radically incompatible with Christianity, not necessarily one framed in deliberate opposition to Christianity). He has to use that language if he is to talk to the people at all, but that necessary apologetic technique does not mean that he accepts the anti-Christian world view; on the

contrary, he knows that if his converse bears fruit, it will end by destroying that view. Just similarly, in dealing with Liberal-humanists or Marxists I frequently talk in their language if it is the only one they will understand, but that does not in any way alter my belief that their world view is fundamentally false.

I would of course agree that God works through the reason and conscience of man, but when Canon Quick refers to these as " another revelation " I must join issue with him, and say that, in my judgment, that is precisely what they are not. Most of the great follies of men have resulted from the exercise of unredeemed " reason " and many of the darkest deeds of history have arisen from unenlightened consciences. The Christian sees the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ at work in nature, but he needs to be a Christian before that can happen. It would perhaps have been less open to misinterpretation had I said that the great verities of the Christian Faith are repugnant to *fallen* man. That, I should say, is not a matter of opinion but a hard fact of any missionary priest's experience. I am not at all adverse to using any means that comes to hand which does not imperil the truth itself, in order to make the truth intelligible to the potential convert, but I am quite clear that no amount of explanation ever converted a fallen man without the intervention of God's grace.

Canon Quick says that it follows from my approach " that it is merely silly for the Christian to attempt to *justify* . . . beliefs and doctrines to the reason of the non-Christian critic ". I agree, for the last thing I ever desire to do is to attempt to justify the truth; it seems to me to come near to blasphemy to do so. God's truth surely needs no justification, but I have, as a matter of fact, spent a good deal of my active life trying to *explain* Christian beliefs and doctrines to non-Christians and I have naturally tried to do so in ways which their minds could follow, but this is very far from " stating the Christian Faith in terms of a non-Christian world view ", it is rather the first step in showing people that their world view is false. Finally, I have quite a lot of Greek blood in my veins and I have no desire to repudiate all in European culture, or for that matter in Christian theology, which is derived from Greece. The reason why my generation is opposed to one type of Liberalism is because we have seen the terrible reaction of blind irrationalism which it has brought about in so many parts of the world, quite as much as because it is in itself so vapid and unsatisfying.

Amongst the moderns I think Canon Quick would find that I and my friends were numbered among the few in these new dark ages who passionately believe in reason.

Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL BRUCE.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I wonder if one of the very young may be permitted a few comments on Professor Quick's letter in the October THEOLOGY, which expressed so admirably the issue between the generations from the viewpoint of the " older " theologians. Because Professor Quick represents so clearly and typically an important position, it may be worth while trying to state, from what he might call an " ultra-orthodox Catholic " standpoint, where his position seems to misrepresent the views to which he objects. This misrepresentation illuminates the issue more clearly perhaps than anything else.

Professor Quick considers the cleavage to be between those who assert that " the Gospel must make its appeal to the reason and conscience in all men " and those who believe in " a closed system of revealed truth ". There is a fatal ambiguity in the statement of both sides. No orthodox Catholic would deny that the Gospel must appeal to the reason and conscience, in the sense that in them it must find an " Anknüpfungspunkt ", and that the Revelation can be probabilified by reason; there are apologetic reasons of considerable weight that go to show, though not to prove, that Jesus' claims to be the Son of God are justified, that the Resurrection is an historical fact, and so on. But this is not to say that " reason and conscience together are the test of revelation, and not *vice versa* ". Reason and conscience cannot judge the Word of God, either by laying down criteria to which it must conform, or by definitely asserting that in Jesus Christ God is manifest. This is the work of faith, and reason, by its very nature, is incompetent to decide, though it can probabilify.

But this does not produce " a closed system " which is " the necessary foundation of all other truths ". By faith we appropriate the revelation of the Word of God, and this is a closed system in the sense that it neither contradicts nor is contradicted by the findings of reason and conscience, and that no other means of knowledge can tell us anything about that sphere. But reason and conscience remain as independent means of knowledge in their own spheres, which are in no wise superseded by revelation. Reason is a more accurate means of knowledge than faith, and reason does not need to be based on faith or any closed system. But reason cannot therefore test the revelation of God.

The Liberal dilemma, as Professor Quick sees it, is " either reason and conscience, or a closed system ". He is thus forced to falsify Catholic theology with its claim that faith alone ultimately is the defence of reason against irrationalism. This Liberal dilemma is the product of what T. E. Hulme calls the demand for " continuity ". Because the Liberal cannot under-

stand a system in which there are various relatively independent spheres, he tends to view those who make such divisions as irrational. Such a system may be less satisfying in some ways than a one-dimensional system, but it is not necessarily less rational, nor are its parts necessarily " closed " in any objectionable sense. We do not know *a priori* that there are not discontinuities in the world. This produces the " reason and conscience versus closed system " dilemma, which is found in all Liberal thought, not merely Christian. It has, among Christians, the tragic result that they can class Catholic theology with Communism and Fascism, without seeing the absurdity.

Yours sincerely,

D. L. Munby.

Advent, 1940

The bloody star
Athwart the earth
Proclaimeth war,
A time of dearth.
The bloody banner and the twisted cross
Declare our deep betrayal and our loss.

Earthquake terror,
Storms of hail—
In cold or heat
Can man avail ?
Already from the borders of the world
The fearful wings approach, the fire is hurled.

O Christ, in this
Last agony
Our faith is nailed
Unto that Tree,
Where bleeding hands and side and feet
Bestowed the promised Paraclete.

Not in vengeance,
Lord, appear;
In Thine Advent
Draw gently near;
Come with Thine angels orderly and bright,
Arouse, forgive, and lead Thy Spouse
To endless Light.

S. L. Bethell.

BOOK REVIEWS

Simeon and Church Order: A Study of the Origin of the Evangelical Revival in Cambridge in the Eighteenth Century. The Birkbeck Lectures for 1837-8. By Charles Smyth. Cambridge University Press. 16s.

Canon Smyth has written an interesting, informing, valuable, and timely book, which will be welcomed by all serious students of contemporary Anglicanism. Few things are more needed at the present time than a just estimate of Evangelicalism in the Church of England, and a right appreciation of its prospects and potentialities. This volume brings an important contribution towards the framing of such an estimate, and the enabling of such an appreciation.

Charles Simeon played in the history of the Evangelical Party a rôle curiously similar to that played by Dr Pusey in the history of the Oxford Movement. No two men, indeed, could have been more dissimilar in temperament and personal taste. The one was an Oxford professor, erudite, shy, tortuous, and tenacious. The other was a Cambridge preacher, neither learned nor shy, but uncommonly enthusiastic, ambitious, and persistent. The one was eminently academic in temper and habit; the other was irrepressibly popular in method and influence. Both the Oxford scholar and the Cambridge preacher disclosed, rather surprisingly, practical capacities of a high order. Under an aspect of disarming innocence and fumbling hesitation, Pusey concealed exceptional gifts of party leadership and statecraft. Simeon was most at home in the noise and excitement of popular religion, a tireless preacher to mixed congregations, but he was also an adroit and enterprising party-manager, an enthusiast and, at the same time, an organizer, an eager propagandist, and not more scrupulous about methods than eager propagandists, as well secular as religious, are apt to be. Pusey's chosen weapon was the pen, Simeon's the spoken word. Pusey's personal influence arrested the Tractarian drift towards Rome, to which Newman's secession had given a powerful impetus. Simeon's personal influence arrested the Evangelical drift towards Dissent, to which both his precept and practice had been thought to point. In both cases the character of the religious movement reflected the occasion which evoked it. Both Tractarianism in Oxford and Evangelicalism in Cambridge were vehement protests against dominant tendencies in the public life of England. The danger to the power and privilege of the Established Church implicit in the reforming activity of the Whig Government gave rise to the one; the extreme debasement of religion in England, and notably in the University of Cambridge, called forth the other. Accordingly, while the one

movement was predominantly ecclesiastical, the other was predominantly moral and spiritual. The one concerned itself with the claims of the institution, the other with the duties of the individual. The one based itself on ecclesiastical precedent, the other on the Scripture. The distinctive instrument of the one was the Catena of authorities, patristic and Anglican. That of the other was the Tract and the homiletic "skeleton" for the guidance of Gospel preachers.

Both movements had roots in the past, representing indeed the incorrigible dissidence of the English Reformation, its unique institutional conservatism, on the one hand, and its frank acceptance of religious innovation on the other. Moreover, both had nearer affinities with the past. What the seceding Non-Jurors were to the Tractarians, that the seceding Methodists were to the Evangelicals. Both, therefore, held loosely to the national establishment, and tended, more or less confessedly, to approximate to external models, Roman in the one case, Dissenting in the other. Simeon belonged to an earlier generation than Pusey, but he was guided by the later precedent. Evangelicalism in the Church of England had less to do with the Puritans of the seventeenth century than with the Methodists of the eighteenth. Not the earlier and Anglican phase of Methodism, but its later phase, when it had entered on the road which could only lead to Dissent, was the source of Anglican Evangelicalism. Accordingly, Evangelicals have never shared the deference to Christian antiquity, and, in particular, the reverence for episcopal authority, which marked the Wesleys. Evangelicalism was never a scholarly movement, though it had its citadel in the University of Cambridge. Bishops were not greatly regarded, nor Sacraments emphasized by the Evangelical stalwarts. Simeon and his disciples were ardently, even passionately, propagandist, and their zeal carried them in one important matter farther than reason or religion can approve. It is equally regrettable and apparent that Evangelicalism has maintained its place within the Established system largely by means of the organized abuse known too well as the Party Patronage Trust.

Both Pusey and Simeon were eminently good men. Both were misunderstood and ill-treated by their contemporaries. They were vilified when living, but honoured when dead. The movements which they started have continued, and expanded. Their tombs are with us unto this day. But to neither prophet was it given to "lead Israel out of Egypt". To-day both Puseyism and Simeonite Evangelicalism are plainly moribund. Whatever form English Christianity may be destined to take in the future, it is certain that it will be neither antiquarian with Pusey nor "Fundamentalist" with Simeon. Since these Prophets have finished their course, other movements have come on the scene, but these have drawn recruits from the

followers of both the organized parties. Indeed, both Christian Socialism and what is conveniently but not very intelligently, described as "Modernism" are less movements of religion than the expression within the religious sphere of contemporary tendencies, economic, social, and intellectual. They modify, but cannot replace, the specifically religious systems. They leave unsolved the problem which now presses menacingly on thoughtful students of human life—viz., What is to be the future of Christianity? Religion is indestructible and Protean, for only so can it match the irreducible requirement of humanity, since man is incorrigibly religious, and never continues in one stage. It cannot be questioned that both the personal religion, which Evangelicalism emphasizes, and the institutional religion, which "Catholics" affirm, express something more than what is non-essential and transitory. Somehow they must be harmonized in a satisfying version of Christianity. Is a working harmony of both attainable within the single system of the English Church? It is too soon to say, but perhaps some elements of the answer are becoming visible.

The future of Evangelical Christianity in the Church of England, and not there only, will turn on its willingness to acknowledge and abandon its distinctive weaknesses—its indifference to learning, its disregard of history, its unintelligent "Fundamentalism", its irrational Puritanism, its self-absorption in sectional interests.

There are many hopeful indications that a new Evangelicalism is taking shape, scholarly, tolerant, teachable, and disciplined. In the critical years which will follow the war, the religious future of the nation will rest largely, perhaps mainly, on such a transformation of Evangelicalism within the English Church.

H. Hensley Henson
(*Bishop*).

The Universities in Transformation. By A. Löwe. Sheldon Press. 1s. 6d.

Dr Adolf Löwe has written a very valuable and stimulating essay on what is for education the most urgent of its problems. It is a book which few Britons could have written; we are too entangled in our traditions and environment: a book which in its accuracy of diagnosis and sensitiveness of perception acquits its author of the easy charge of combining either superficiality or patronage with his detachment. To criticize so condensed and so controversial an essay would strictly require a volume at least as large.

His diagnosis of the position is hardly disputable. Affirming that in the late nineteenth century the Oxford Greats School succeeded in combining cultural and vocational elements and in giving an education appropriate to the social order and needs

of the time, and that to-day " Cambridge has acquired a symbolic significance for the English University system corresponding to that which Oxford had " then (an affirmation which makes a member of that University blush), he points out that neither the ancient nor the modern universities have kept pace with the great and rapid changes now transforming society. They have, in effect, ceased to educate, since their cultural teaching has lost touch with the social environment and become an anachronism, and their vocational teaching has been so narrowed and professionalized as to produce specialized robots rather than human citizens. Dr Löwe puts this more politely: but it is what his courteous paragraphs mean. And to a very large extent we all know that it is true; and yet we do nothing about it. As a relevant illustration is it necessary to look for any other reason for the failure of the Church to give appropriate leadership than the fact that all its bishops are Oxford Greats men belonging, according to Dr Löwe, to an admirable but wholly out-of-date culture?

Most of us realize what is wrong, even if we are not ready to admit that the social changes are as yet so radical as Dr Löwe suggests.

The problem of a remedy is less easy; and here, though the proposals put forward are valuable and deserve very careful consideration, criticism is inevitable. It is probably true to say that during the past thirty years the ablest educationalists have all been looking for the " new humanities ". They realize that the old Classical or Greats tradition is increasingly irrelevant: they also realize that psychology, sociology, and even history and modern languages have not yet produced a type of curriculum comparable in educative value with the old subjects. It still remains true that the Classical discipline produces a combination of imaginative insight and accurate thinking which no " modern " subject at present approaches. Put otherwise, the first-class Greats or Classical Tripos man can take up any other subject except pure mathematics and certain branches of science and beat the man trained in it. This cannot be an insuperable dilemma: but until much more study has been given to producing real educational value in the " new humanities ", the problem of cultural education will remain unsolved. Dr Löwe's proposals depend upon its solution; and it is curious that he does not refer to the gallant attempt made to promote geography to the position of a central synthesizing subject.

Granted a satisfactory discovery of the educational possibilities of the " new humanities ", Dr Löwe's survey of more detailed reforms by way of revising the Tripos system or humanizing the vocational subjects, by changing the character of lectures and examinations, and by promoting a post-graduate school of cultural synthesis is a really important contribution. Some progress in some of these directions is being made: but it is still

spasmodic, empirical and unco-ordinated. It is to be hoped that his book will arouse the universities to a more conscious recognition of the need and practicability of reform in these directions.

Probably the two chief defects in his work are: first, his setting aside of the responsibilities of the universities for research; and secondly, his neglect of the vitally and increasingly important problems of the sciences.

To combine the functions of education and of research is, as all university teachers know, exceedingly difficult. The increase in the sheer bulk of knowledge, reinforcing as it does the economic necessity of finding employment, compels a measure of specialization. Can we afford to give half a university course to general and cultural training when rigid narrowing of interest seems essential if competent research or even a livelihood is to be achieved? It is probably true that the universities have betrayed their name in the desire to promote research at the expense of education: in many cases they have become little more than aggregates of Technical Colleges, turning out "professionals" rather than educated citizens. But the difficulty remains, and Dr Löwe does not face it.

His lack of appreciation of science is even more serious: for the scientific outlook is a dominant factor in our social environment and a supremely important instrument in the shaping of the future. "New humanities" which ignore physics and biology hardly deserve the name. Certainly an essay on university education which accepts the segregation of arts and sciences (as Dr Löwe appears to do) cannot do justice to its subject. Important as this volume is, there is need to supplement it by a full treatment of the place and quality of the sciences in a modern education; some of us feel that the synthesis between arts and sciences (and that is the recognition that science cannot be excluded from a cultural education, even if its place therein is not easy to determine) is for the universities the most relevant issue of the time. And of this Dr Löwe has nothing to say.

C. E. Raven.

Theism and Cosmology. By John Laird. Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

Perhaps the most important result of Lord Gifford's bequest has been the attraction of "secular" philosophers to the field of natural theology, an excursion which has frequently benefited all concerned. Professor Laird, the latest Gifford Lecturer, confesses that he finds the subject fascinating; and his thorough and good-humoured discussion of his theme makes refreshing reading. Although the present book contains only the first series of a course of lectures on "Metaphysics and Theism",

he claims, quite justly I think, that it is self-complete in substance. Theism, Professor Laird asserts, is a major philosophical hypothesis. For him the term embraces not only monotheism but also respectable deisms, polytheisms and pantheisms. In fact, the ostensible object of his book is to discuss "deistic theism" from the standpoint of a "provisional realism"; in other words, to discover how far we can ascend from the facts (*a*) that the world in some sense exists, and (*b*) that it is the kind of world it is. The two vehicles most frequently employed for this ascent from the existence and nature of the world to the existence of God have been the cosmological argument and the argument from design. To these arguments the author has devoted much of his attention. As in a Socratic dialogue, however, the interest lies rather in the "side-shows" than in the ostensible conclusion. The two arguments themselves, after a kindly but scrupulous examination, are found to be sadly deficient; the argument from design, despite the celebrity of its sponsors, receiving the greater condemnation. Few will dispute Professor Laird's conclusion; there is nothing in nature that *proves* the existence of God. (We may, of course, maintain that this is not the whole story. Professor Laird would hardly be concerned to deny that there may be something in a mellow autumn countryside that "reminds" us of Deity.) Some people, indeed, may think that the author has been merely exhuming long-deceased sophistries; but he points out that refutations may become antiquated as well as proofs, and, in any case, the discussion of the two arguments was worth while, since it led to the treatment of many important questions. This latter claim is amply justified: Professor Laird's excellent disquisitions on space, causation, creation, teleology and logical positivism are perhaps the most useful parts of his book.

It must not be supposed that the results of the argument are entirely negative; there are certain positive findings, or to put it less rashly, there are certain things the author is not prepared to deny. We shall now consider these. In discussing the argument from design, Professor Laird strongly emphasized the wide distribution of teleological patterns in nature. These patterns, he is prepared to allow, may be deiform; "there is much to suggest the deiformity of nature" (317). This is perhaps the strongest theistic assertion to which Professor Laird commits himself in the present volume; perhaps we shall see it elaborated in his second book. As it stands, it obviously savours of pantheism, but he is not at all perturbed by this. In fact, two other considerations tend to lead him to a pantheistic conclusion. First, he holds with Henry More that it is much more sensible to say that God is everywhere than to say He is nowhere or somewhere; and this contention is at least compatible with pantheism. Secondly, Professor Laird's views on time and change tend also in this direction. He takes his stand beside

such philosophers as Bergson, Alexander and Whitehead, who have Heraclitus to their father; coming-to-be, he declares, is the "marrow and essence" of all actuality. No timeless being, standing aloof from the temporal world, could be the source of cosmic process. If there exists a God who has dealings with this changing world, He must also be "in the making". It is obvious that such a theory would be quite at ease with pantheism.

This is hardly the place for a detailed criticism of Heracliteanism. Admittedly, Professor Laird puts it forward in no dogmatic spirit, but the justification he does offer for it is scarcely convincing (170 *f.*). (Unless we accept this view, he says, we seem to eviscerate time; but is this a fatal objection? Or again, this view explains why we cannot foreknow the future; but may not this inability be just ultimate fact?) Moreover, there still remains unanswered the stock objection that there are several *mental* phenomena—recognition and the awareness of succession, for instance—for which such a theory can find no place. On the other hand, there are, no doubt, many difficulties in the opposite view that a *timeless* being has created and conserves a temporal process. One is naturally reminded of J. L. Stocks' recent attempt to surmount those obstacles with the aid of the *formal* cause. But is there not a *via media* here for a Christian metaphysic? Need we hold that God is a *timeless* Being? Is it not enough to say that He abides unchanged from everlasting to everlasting? We could therefore agree with Professor Laird that God is not timeless in the sense in which a universal is, but we need not subscribe to the theory of a God-in-the-making.

The normal attributes of God and the ontological argument are two of the topics reserved for the second series of lectures. The "provisional realisms" of the first series will also be examined. In the present book, Professor Laird has preferred to explore logical possibilities rather than to defend ready-made positions; he has given us more scepticism than construction. He has certainly done plenty of honest shirt-sleeve thinking on important questions, and the value of such work none can deny. This volume will whet many appetites; and, unlike Oliver Twist, we can hopefully ask for more.

E. J. Furlong.

The Gospel of the Kingdom. The Haskell Lectures, 1940. By Frederick C. Grant. Macmillan. 7s. 6d.

In these lectures Dr Grant outlines the gospel of Jesus as he conceives that modern New Testament criticism is able to reconstruct it. His scope is both wider and narrower than the title of the book suggests. In the first five chapters he is largely concerned with the political and social environment of the gospels. Working backwards from Tacitus he stresses the political aspect

of the Crucifixion, indicates the probable growth of the gospel tradition as the form critics have taught us to see it, and sketches the public careers of the Baptist and Jesus and their historical background. It is here that he is most illuminating. In Chapter VI he deals more extensively with what is touched on throughout, the teaching of Jesus. His thesis is that Jesus was the leader of a popular movement far more widespread than the gospels suggest; that His message was wholly " religious " in the Jewish sense of the word as embracing the whole of life; that it was not new but, being in line with the teaching of the prophets and far removed from that of the apocalyptists, was a gospel of social redemption in which He expected to see the kingdom of God realized upon the soil of Palestine within His own time; that He was put to death, as St Luke's Gospel hints, as an agitator suspected of revolution; and that the presentation of Him as Messiah is a later interpretation woven by the Church into the tradition at various stages of its transmission.

It is unfortunate that the limitations of the lecture method prevent Dr Grant from assembling here in greater detail the evidence which is given in his earlier and more technical books upon the subject and upon which his judgments are based. For he would seem to raise more questions than he answers and to betray too little rather than too much scepticism. The messiahship of Jesus he concludes to be everywhere a later interpretation of the Church; but can all the passages which imply messiahship be detached from the sources and leave behind not a number of discordant fragments but a coherent whole capable of being called a " gospel ", a non-christological, uninterpreted, historical account? " The tradition has been influenced by the ' Son of Man ' dogma; but it has not been completely transformed. If there are passages in the gospels that show clear affiliation with the Book of Enoch, there are plenty of others that betray no such influence or affiliation. And it is not difficult to determine which are the more unmodified and authentic " (p. 68). But is it on strictly critical grounds that they are declared authentic? For the " Son of Man " dogma is present in all the sources and in various " forms " of the tradition. Are then all the sources tainted? Is not Jesus perhaps completely buried beneath interpretation? Or is it that Dr Grant has little sympathy with eschatology (" eschatology will probably continue inevitably to be a minor emphasis in our teaching," pp. 182-3) and none at all with apocalyptic (" What is difficult to see is how modern interpreters can assume that Jesus thought of Himself as the celestial ' Son of Man ' . . . and at the same time attribute such deluded fanaticism to the perfectly sane, balanced, clear-seeing and profoundly religious mind reflected in the main body of the evangelic tradition," p. 153)? Though His message was not new, " after all Jesus was unique and does not fit into any specified category, ancient or modern "; He is " more than a prophet ".

This may be true, yet none other than subjective grounds are given for thinking so; and it is difficult to see what "more than a prophet" could mean to a Jew of the first century A.D. except the Messiah or someone closely related to Him, or how "uniqueness", in the strict sense of that word, could be conveyed even by Jesus Himself, otherwise than by the use of eschatological and messianic imagery. "To put it plainly, for Jesus to claim Himself to be the head of God's Kingdom . . . would have been nothing short of blasphemy" (p. 127), and yet the evidence of the tradition on the whole suggests that blasphemy was the growing accusation of His opponents against Jesus throughout the ministry, however it may have been, in the special Lukan material, finally formulated before the Roman governor.

Dr Grant does not consider the authenticity of those sayings in which Jesus speaks of the necessity of His death. "Thousands died at the hands of Rome, nailed or tied to crosses and perishing of thirst. . . . What is distinctive about the Christian story is the character, the spirit, the attitude and bearing of the Central Figure of the tragedy" (p. 78). But this can hardly be said to account for the central position in the tradition of a Passion narrative which says surprisingly little about such things. Indeed, if apocalyptic symbolism and the divine necessity of His death were shown on rigidly critical grounds to have belonged to the gospel of Jesus Himself, then some modification would have to be made of the statement that He expected the Kingdom of God to be realized upon the soil of Palestine within His own time.

C. F. Evans.

Boethius. By Helen M. Barrett. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

Boethius is singularly little known even to the well-informed reader. As a subject of knowledge, he has all the ingredients of exciting interest. He lived in a collapsing society; he was a defender of civilization against barbarism; he suffered injustice at the hands of absolute power; and persisted in his beliefs and loyalties to the very end. Such characteristics ought to recommend him to a contemporary reader, who is also living in a disintegrating world, and who is witnessing—Heaven knows—injustice triumphing over the weak. Yet Miss Barrett somehow fails to make Boethius live. In her book of 169 pages, right to its end, he remains an ancient corpse.

Boethius belonged to one of the ruling families of Rome, and himself was one of "the last of the barons". Born towards the end of the fifth century, he grew to manhood in a decaying society. Theodoric, a barbarian, had in fact, though not in theory, assumed the faded purple of the Cæsars. In the year 510 Boethius attained the Consulship of Rome, the highest executive office in the Western Empire. He was, after many

years, arrested for alleged conspiracy against Theodoric. During his imprisonment he wrote the famous work for which he is best known, *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Finally he was executed. Legend has it that Theodoric bitterly repented of his decision to execute Boethius.

What light does *The Consolation of Philosophy* throw upon the great problem of social disintegration, and the reaction of men's souls to it?

In his book Boethius treats of four themes: (1) the existence of evil; (2) the moral government of the universe; (3) how to reconcile human freedom with God's foreknowledge; and (4) the meaning of eternal life. These were the questions that emerged out of his experience of bitterness and disappointment. After serving Theodoric with conspicuous zeal and loyalty, why should he be rewarded at the end with imprisonment and cruelty and death? That is the real question with which Boethius is concerned behind the larger, abstract questions he asks.

I cannot escape the feeling that Boethius, like all men who are merely philosophers, is desperately seeking to avoid facing the final fact of human life, its basic contradiction and irrationality. Even in his desperate situation he still preserves the pride of thinking that he, Boethius, can find or create the solution of life's problems himself. So, like every Stoic, he "kids" himself that virtue is its own reward and tries to persuade himself that he is happier as a sufferer of injustice than the perpetrator of the injustice. Boethius is one of the earliest of the humanists. He elaborates an argument to screen the ugly, radical disaster of human nature. The one thing—good man—that he will not face is despair of himself. Hence the consolation of philosophy.

Miss Barrett has written a conscientious book. She gives the reliably known facts of her subject's life and death. She traces the sources of the thought of Boethius, his indebtedness to Plato in particular. But her book lacks fire. Boethius does not come to life. She concludes that Boethius was not Christian—and I agree. He was a humanist in a situation that shrieked out the inadequacy of philosophy to heal the mortal disease of the soul of man.

D. R. Davies.

The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253. By S. Harrison Thomson. Cambridge University Press. 21s.

Professor Harrison Thomson is well known in this country for his valuable work on Wyclyf, but for some years he had been turning his attention to Grosseteste, whose writings were held in such esteem by Wyclyf that the Bohemian scribes who were sent to make their hurried copies of the latter's works in the early fifteenth century made copies of some of the great Bishop's writings as well.

In this admirable volume Professor Thomson has laid the foundation for a definitive study of Grosseteste's work. The immensity of his task may be gathered when it is said that he visited 140 libraries and examined 2,400 manuscripts. As a result, we are now in a position to separate the authentic works of Grosseteste from the *dubia* and *spuria*, and to know a great deal about the principal manuscript collections of his writings. The chief value of Stevenson's well-known Life of Grosseteste, which was based exclusively on printed sources, was in the picture it drew of the great ecclesiastic. It was not possible then to deal thoroughly with Grosseteste's share in the wonderful intellectual movement associated in England with the University of Oxford. Grosseteste was one of the few scholars of whom Roger Bacon was accustomed to speak with respect. "The Lord Robert of Lincoln" had a good knowledge of Greek, so that, in his episcopal period at least, he habitually used the LXX, and also the Greek N.T. Bacon seems to attribute to him a knowledge of Hebrew as well; it is possible that he did possess a Hebrew text of the O.T., but Professor Thomson doubts whether his knowledge of the language went very far. His translations from the Greek, literal and accurate, included the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, the works of St John Damascene, the four chief works of the Pseudo-Dionysius, and the Ignatian Epistles. It is certain also that he is the author of a translation of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle as well as of the Greek commentators on the same work.

His original scientific and philosophical works are many in number, and they show how fully he had mastered and made use of the "new" Aristotle, the Arabian scientists, as well as Ptolemy and Euclid. Professor Thomson deals just as thoroughly with the pastoral and devotional works, the sermons, the letters, and the writings in Anglo-Norman French, among them the well-known *Chasteau d'Amour*. Specially interesting is the discussion of the documents relating to Grosseteste's visit to the Roman Curia in 1250. On p. 248 Professor Thomson decides against the Bishop's authorship of the Latin poem known as the *Visio Philiberti*, and is inclined to ascribe it to Philip the Chancellor. But, if I remember rightly, the latter does not in any other poem use the "goliardic" measure in which the *Visio* is written, and the execution is below his standard.

Professor Thomson's volume provides a feast of delights for the student of the literary history of the thirteenth century, and it is, appropriately, dedicated to Dr A. G. Little, to whom many of us who have worked on this period owe much in the way of encouragement, and advice most generously given.

F. J. E. Raby.

De la Méthode Irénique. By Dom C. Lialine. Prieuré d'Amay-sur-Meuse. Chevtogne. 6 frs.

This small book is a reprint of articles which appeared in *Irénikon* in 1938. Its outlook will be familiar to readers of that journal or of the works of Congar, Pribilla, Dom Beauduin and others. " L'Irénique " is defined as the conciliary attitude of one man who is searching for truth towards another man, or group of men, who he has reason to think are actuated by like motives. The author proceeds to sketch an outline of this method in its most general form, whence he concludes that the " irenic " method has for its aim to make *apparent* oppositions between different confessions disappear, and *real* ones appear. He stresses the fact that the " irenic " theologian is never the apologist or the sentimentalist, but is, *par excellence*, the traditionalist in the sense that he shows forth " la plénitude essentielle, traditionelle et charismatique, de la Pentecôte " and " l'éternelle pensée de Dieu sur l'humanité ". The method is applied to a number of concrete examples, and the second half of the work is taken up almost exclusively with applying it to the problem of Roman-Orthodox union. The whole is, indeed, an excellent *apologia* for the position of *Irénikon* itself.

H. R. T. B.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

Allen and Unwin: W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, vol. iii (1640-1660) (21s.); Sir James Baillie, *Spiritual Religion* (1s.).

Geoffrey Bles: C. S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* (3s. 6d.); J. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics* (10s. 6d.).

Burns Oates: J. O'Connell, *The Rite of Low Mass*, vol. ii (10s. 6d.); T. Maynard, *Apostle of Charity* (St Vincent de Paul) (7s. 6d.); T. J. Hardy, *How I came to Acknowledge the Pope* (1s.); R. A. Knox, *Captive Flames* (5s.).

Centenary Press: A. A. David, *The Activity of God;* C. A. Alington, *The Kingdom of God* (3s. 6d. each).

C.L.A.: M. Bruce, *Ye are the Body of Christ* (4d.); F. B. Flint, *Facing the Facts* (6d.).

Dacre Press: G. B. Bentley, *Catholic Design for Living* (1s.); P. Maryon-Wilson, *The Vocation of the Laity* (6d.).

Faber and Faber: C. M. Ady, *The English Church and How it Works* (10s. 6d.).

Gibbs and Sons (Canterbury): *The Church's Hour*—a tract for these times by priests of the Diocese of Canterbury (n.p.).

Hague and Gill: G. Vann, *Saint Thomas Aquinas* (6s.).

Macmillan: A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (10s. 6d.).

Mowbrays: H. A. Wilson, *Received with Thanks* (7s. 6d.); Bede Frost, *Who? A Book about God* (5s.); W. H. Elliott, *Be of Good Cheer* (2s. 6d.); A. W. Hopkinson, *The Seven Sacraments* (2s. 6d.); C. P. S. Clarke, *Bishop Chandler* (3s. 6d.).

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Printed in Great Britain
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher